Auto negligence; Comparative fault; MCL 500.3135(2)(b); The “assured clear distance ahead” rule (MCL 257.627(1)); Cole v Barber; Exceeding the speed limit; MCL 257.627(16) & 257.628(9); Inferring negligence from evidence of a motor vehicle statute violation; Gould v Atwell; Impeding traffic (MCL 257.676b); Intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED); Doe v Mills; Motion in limine to preclude an officer’s testimony about a vehicle’s speed; Lay witness opinion testimony; MRE 701; Miller v Hensley; Whether a written order accurately reflected the trial court’s bench ruling

The court held that the trial court properly denied defendant summary disposition on plaintiff’s negligence claim and properly granted plaintiff’s motion in limine but erred in denying defendant summary disposition of the IIED claim. As to plaintiff’s cross-appeal, it disagreed that the trial court’s written order on the motion in limine should be vacated on the basis it failed to accurately reflect the trial court’s ruling from the bench. A vehicle driven by defendant struck and killed plaintiff’s wife, Valinda, a pedestrian. Defendant first argued that the trial court erred by denying his summary disposition motion as to the negligence/gross negligence claim. The court disagreed, concluding there was “evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that defendant operated his vehicle negligently.” A police officer who is certified in accident reconstruction “testified that defendant exceeded the posted speed limit of 25 miles per hour when his vehicle struck Valinda, and that he never engaged his brakes. Indeed, the vehicle does not appear to slow down in the video footage of the incident.” The video showed that while “it was dark, streetlights illuminated the area, and defendant’s headlights illuminated the path ahead of him. This evidence could support a finding that [he] failed to exercise due care, . . . and violated statutes concerning speeding and the assured clear distance ahead rule, such that the jury may infer negligence.” The court also found that there was evidence allowing a jury to “conclude that Valinda was negligent.” It noted that neither “party presented any evidence that pedestrians had a right-of-way at that intersection. Circumstantial evidence suggests that Valinda did not see the vehicle, and therefore did not look to see whether a vehicle was approaching. A jury could therefore find that she did not exercise due care before or while crossing, . . . or that she impeded traffic under MCL 257.676b.” Thus, the court concluded there was “evidence from which a jury could determine that both defendant and Valinda shared fault for the accident.” But as to the IIED claim, the court found that no evidence supported the first element. As to the motion in limine, it held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by precluding another police officer from testifying about the speed of defendant’s vehicle where his “testimony was not made on the basis of [his] personal observations and analysis of the accident scene.” Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.