Whether a negligence claim was barred by the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act’s (WDCA) exclusive remedy provision (MCL 418.131(1)); Presumption under MCL 418.301(3); Harris v Vernier; Simkins v General Motors Corp; Distinguishing MacDonald v Michigan Bell Tel Co

The court held that the WDCA’s exclusive remedy provision barred “plaintiff’s negligence and owner-liability claims” and thus, the trial court erred in denying defendant-Kloss’s summary disposition motion under MCR 2.116(C)(4). They worked at the same hospital. After finishing a shift, plaintiff left “and began walking to her car in the hospital’s parking lot.” She turned back because she forgot something. As she “was walking across a crosswalk, defendant made a left-hand turn and struck her with his car. Plaintiff received worker’s compensation payments until she returned to her job” and she filed this suit. The court agreed with defendant that the trial court erred in denying him summary disposition because the WDCA’s exclusive remedy provision barred the negligence claim. Plaintiff asserted it did not apply because the accident “occurred in a roadway, not in the hospital’s parking lot.” She further contended it “did not occur within a reasonable time after the parties’ shifts ended.” The court disagreed, noting that under MCL 418.301(3), an “‘employee going to or from his or her work, while on the premises where the employee’s work is to be performed, and within a reasonable time before and after his or her working hours, is presumed to be in the course of his or her employment.’” In addition, there was “no evidence to suggest that the hospital controlled the individual parking lots, but not the roadways connecting them. And even if we were to assume that the hospital did not control the roadway where the accident occurred, ‘an employee need not strictly be on the employer’s “premises” in order to be presumed to be in the course of his employment[.]’” While plaintiff relied on MacDonald, the court noted that unlike “MacDonald, plaintiff did not leave the hospital premises before the collision, nor did she present any evidence demonstrating that walking back to the hospital was a ‘personal, non-work related activit[y] . . . .’” While the accident “occurred 35 to 40 minutes after the parties’ shifts ended, [she] fails to explain how an additional 5 to 10 minutes necessarily means that the accident did not occur within a reasonable time after her shift.” As the evidence showed “the collision occurred in the course of [her] employment, the exclusive remedy provision” applied. Reversed and remanded for entry of summary disposition for defendant.