Termination under §§ 19b(3)(b)(i), (b)(ii), (j), & (k)(ii); The doctrine of anticipatory neglect; Children’s best interests; In re Olive/Metts; Jurisdiction; MCL 712A.2(b)(1) & (2); Credibility

Noting that the “single abuse of one, unrelated child can, as a matter of law, support terminating parental rights under” §§ (b)(i) and (k)(ii), the court held that §§ (b)(i), (j), and (k)(ii) supported terminating respondent-father’s rights. It also rejected respondent-mother’s challenge to the trial court’s decision to assert jurisdiction and held that §§ (b)(ii) and (j) supported termination of her parental rights. Further, it concluded the trial court did not clearly err in finding that termination of both respondents’ rights was in the children’s best interests. The mother was the biological mother of all five children at issue here – NP, DP, MP, DBC, and LBC. The father was the biological father of DBC and LBC. While the DHHS did not cite § (b)(i) in its petition as a basis for seeking to terminate his “rights, the trial court’s reliance on this ground does not require reversal when there were other grounds supported by [its] ruling and only one ground is required” for termination. Further, he had notice the DHHS was relying on § (b) “and that the facts in support of terminating his parental rights involved his sexual abuse of NP, not his failure to protect NP from sexual abuse.” While he also asserted the trial court erred in relying on the anticipatory neglect doctrine, “the trial court did not base its findings solely on” this doctrine. The court found that “NP’s testimony established that a sibling of [the] father’s children suffered sexual abuse caused by [the] father. Given the abuse inflicted on NP, it was also not error for the trial court to find that DBC and LBC faced a reasonable likelihood that they also would suffer injury or abuse if placed with [him], even if they might not have been subject to the same type of sexual abuse NP suffered.” As to the mother’s jurisdictional challenge, the court held that the DHHS “met its burden by showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the children were neglected because [she] failed to protect NP from sexual abuse after it was apparent that NP was being abused. The mental well-being of the children also was at a substantial risk of harm from [the] mother’s failure to protect them.” And for the same reasons, the DHHS established that her “home, by reason of neglect, was an unfit place for the children to live in when she again failed to take reasonable steps to protect the children from abuse by [the] father, supporting jurisdiction under MCL 712A.2(b)(2).” Affirmed.