Electrocution injury; Causation; Skinner v Square D Co; Res ipsa loquitur; Need for expert testimony; Pugno v Blue Harvest Farms LLC; Admissibility of affidavits; MCR 2.119(B)(1), MCR 1.109(D)(3); Rataj v City of Romulus; Duty; Foreseeability when interrupting 3-phase power; Schultz v Consumers Power Co; El-Jamaly v Kirco Manix Constr, LLC

Holding that plaintiff failed to present admissible, non-speculative evidence that defendants’ conduct proximately caused his injuries, and he could not proceed on his res ipsa theory, the court affirmed summary disposition for defendants. Plaintiff, an auto-shop employee, alleged he was electrocuted while trying to shut off a burning air compressor as defendant-DTE’s contractor (defendant-Lecom) was replacing pole crossarms and had taken the 3-phase transformer offline. Defendants’ expert attributed the fire to “single phasing” from running a three-phase motor on single-phase power, and plaintiff’s purported expert submission was unsigned and undated. The trial court granted defendants’ summary disposition motion, holding the proffer from plaintiff’s expert was inadmissible and the remaining record did not raise a fact question on causation. On appeal, the court agreed the filing “was an ‘unsworn averment’” and “an unsigned, unnotarized ‘affidavit’ is no affidavit at all,” so it could not be considered. It rejected plaintiff’s res ipsa theory because electrical causation and overvoltage allegations are not within common knowledge and the “‘fact that the injury complained of does not ordinarily occur in the absence of negligence must either be supported by expert testimony or must be within the common understanding of the jury.’” Turning to his direct-evidence negligence theory, the court acknowledged duty and a fact question on breach, and that cause-in-fact could be inferred from the “known condition that results in ‘single phasing’ and overheating of the motor,” but held that plaintiff fell short on legal causation. It noted his theory that defendants “added” voltage to 440 volts rested only on his lay inference from a loud noise. “‘To be adequate, a plaintiff’s circumstantial proof must facilitate reasonable inferences of causation, not mere speculation.’” The court found that it “must conclude that plaintiff’s theory is simply too speculative to support a genuine issue of material fact on causation.”