Attorney fees; Reasonableness; Lack of contemporaneous records; Olson v Olson; Use of opposing counsel’s hours as a proxy; Credibility; SBR Holdings, LLC (SBR)

Holding that the trial court’s attorney “fee award was not outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes[,]” the court affirmed the $171,600 attorney fee award to appellees. Appellant argued the trial court abused its discretion “because they failed to keep contemporaneous records, rendering their billing schedule incredible, and the use of opposing counsel’s hours was improper.” But he pointed “to no authority indicating that Michigan law requires that attorneys keep contemporaneous records.” And the court recognized in Olson “that contemporaneous records, while important in determining the reasonableness of an attorney’s requested fees, are not mandatory[.]” The Special Master here “conducted a lengthy hearing during which several witnesses were placed under oath. The trial court subsequently held another evidentiary hearing at which it independently heard from additional witnesses placed under oath.” The court found that as “both the Special Master and the trial court recognized, appellees’ failure to keep contemporaneous records did not negate the ‘undisputed evidence’ that [they] provided legal services for appellant in the lengthy, complex underlying litigation. We are particularly persuaded by the fact that the trial court presided over the underlying litigation, and was therefore able to personally evaluate appellees’ contributions to the case. This, coupled with the testimonies of the other attorneys who explained the extent of appellees’ participation in relation to opposing counsel and the other defendant’s counsel, was sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that appellees spent roughly the same amount of time on the underlying litigation, overall, as opposing counsel.” Appellant also seemed “to take issue with the fact that the Special Master, and, by extension, the trial court, failed to determine the credibility of the witnesses, instead choosing to weigh the circumstantial evidence as to which side was more likely.” Appellant did “not explain why the decision to weigh the evidence to see which party’s theory is more likely is somehow erroneous. Furthermore, the trial court did address [his] expert’s credibility when it noted with which portions of his testimony it agreed and disagreed, and” the court gives deference to a trial court’s superior position to assess witness credibility. Appellant next argued “that, while there was circumstantial evidence supporting the Special Master’s, and, by extension, the trial court’s, findings, other circumstantial evidence weighs against them.” But he merely provided “a laundry list of evidence that could have led the trial court to a different conclusion.” While the evidence here “was far from conclusive, the evidence on which the trial court relied was more than sufficient to withstand appellate review. The mere fact that there is other evidence which could lead to an alternative conclusion is not enough to overturn the trial court’s finding.”