Tax foreclosure sale surplus proceeds; Constitutionality of the procedural requirements in MCL 211.78t; Exclusivity of the statute; In re Muskegon Cnty Treasurer for Foreclosure; In re Barry Cnty Treasurer; Constructive trust; In re State Treasurer for Foreclosure (Unpub); Foreclosing governmental unit (FGU)
The court concluded that respondents did not “assert valid constitutional claims for a takings violation or a procedural due-process violation. MCL 211.78t is the exclusive mechanism for obtaining remaining proceeds, and” the court’s holding in Muskegon Treasurer was “binding, controlling precedent.” Thus, it affirmed the trial court’s ruling denying respondents’ motion to compel petitioner-county treasurer “to disburse any remaining proceeds from the tax-foreclosure sale” at issue. As was the case with the respondents in Muskegon Treasurer, respondents here failed to “file the notice required by MCL 211.78t(2) by the July 1 deadline,” leading to the dismissal of their claim. On appeal, they raised “most of the same arguments raised by respondents in Muskegon Treasurer.” First, they asserted that “MCL 211.78t is not the exclusive means of recovering surplus proceeds,” and that Muskegon Treasurer was wrongly decided. But they did not identify any errors in the court’s opinion in that case, and the court noted that the “Supreme Court denied the former owners’ request for leave to appeal in Muskegon Treasurer[.]” As to their taking claim, like the respondents in Muskegon Treasurer and Barry Treasurer, because they “failed to follow the statutory pathway provided to recover any surplus proceeds, they could not then claim an unconstitutional taking.” As to the alleged procedural due process violations, the court’s holding in Muskegon Treasurer likewise applied squarely here. Further, the court disagreed with their contention that the trial court erred in dismissing their request to impose a constructive trust over the remaining proceeds. It noted that it recently addressed a similar argument in State Treasurer, where it “stated: ‘An FGU’s compliance with the statutory scheme cannot provide grounds for imposing a constructive trust.’” In addition, it stated: “‘[A]n equitable remedy such as the imposition of a constructive trust would contravene the Legislature’s clearly stated intent and essentially nullify MCL 211.78t.’”
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