Expert testimony; Alleged vouching for the victim’s credibility; People v Peterson; Testimony about the victim’s psychiatric diagnoses; Prosecutorial misconduct/error; Evidence of defendant’s alcohol consumption; Relevance; Whether error warranted reversal; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to raise a futile objection

The court held that challenged expert testimony was not improper, and rejected defendant’s prosecutorial error and ineffective assistance of counsel claims. While it concluded evidence about defendant’s alcohol consumption was erroneously admitted, it found that he failed to show the error was outcome determinative. Thus, it affirmed his CSC I and II convictions. The victim (KR) reported that defendant repeatedly sexually assaulted her between the ages of 7 or 8 through 10. On appeal, defendant challenged the admission of a forensic interviewer’s (W) testimony. But the court found that W’s general testimony about “delayed disclosure provided relevant information, and defendant has not presented any basis for concluding that [it] strayed from its proper purposes. Further, [W’s] explanation of the forensic-interview process did not vouch for KR’s credibility. [W’s] statements about the forensic-interview process, which were primarily centered on her qualifications as an expert, demonstrated that the protocol could either support or refute an allegation.” While defendant asserted that W’s “use of the word ‘disclosure’ implied that KR was bringing forth a hidden ‘truth’ and that defendant was guilty[,]” the court concluded that her statements “were not specific to KR and did not constitute any comment on the veracity of KR’s specific allegations. Significantly, [W] acknowledged that she had not spoken with KR or reviewed any of her records. Therefore, [W’s] testimony was not improper and did not vouch for” KR’s credibility. As to a doctor’s (V) testimony, V “testified about KR’s diagnoses, but the testimony was devoid of any reference to sexual abuse.” The court found that V “properly testified about KR’s hallucinations without directly or indirectly referring to KR’s allegations.” The court held that the evidence about defendant’s alcohol consumption “should have been inadmissible as largely, if not wholly, irrelevant, and unfairly prejudicial.” It noted this “was a ‘he said/she said’ trial, not a ‘he doesn’t remember/she said’ trial.” But this evidence “was a relatively minor part of defendant’s testimony and the trial evidence as a whole. The trial court gave a proper limiting” jury instruction, and “the key evidence—KR’s testimony of abuse versus defendant’s testimony of no abuse—did not involve alcohol, except for KR’s one-word answer that [he] smelled of ‘alcohol’ during” one incident, and the jury acquitted him of a related CSC I count.