Constitutionality of court-ordered fines, costs, & fees; Const 1963, art 8, § 9; People v Carter (Unpub); People v Earl

The court held that the trial court-ordered payments at issue were not unconstitutional. Defendant was convicted of meth possession. On appeal, he challenged “the constitutionality of his court-ordered fines, costs, and assessments.” First, he argued that the costs and fines were excessive. He “was convicted under MCL 333.7403(2)(b)(i), which exposed him to potential imprisonment of up to 10 years and ‘a fine of not more than’” $15,000. Thus, the “total court-ordered payment of $1,798 in costs, fines, and fees was well below the maximum potential financial penalty for” his conviction. Further, the total was not disproportionate considered in relation to his “offense or ability to pay. Although the trial court did not focus at sentencing on [his] ability to pay, [he] reported having employment opportunities. The ordered payment was not unreasonable or disproportionate under the circumstances,” and he did not show plain error. Next, defendant argued “that the costs and fees that the trial court ordered under MCL 769.1j, MCL 769.1k, and MCL 780.905 are unconstitutional because they do not fund public libraries as required by the Michigan Constitution. Our Michigan Constitution provides, in relevant part, that ‘[a]ll fines assessed and collected in the several counties, townships and cities for any breach of the penal laws shall be exclusively applied to the support of such public libraries, and county law libraries as provided by law.’” The court noted that under “MCL 769.1k(1)(a), a trial court ‘shall impose the minimum state costs as set forth in [MCL 769.1j]’ when sentencing a defendant. MCL 769.1j(1)(a) provides that a person convicted of a felony shall be assessed, at minimum, $68 in costs. These minimum costs are paid to the justice system fund. MCL 769.1j(2). Further, the trial court may impose any fines authorized by statute for the violation of which the defendant was convicted, any costs authorized by statute for which the defendant was convicted, and ‘any cost reasonably related to the actual costs incurred by the trial court.’” In addition, “MCL 780.905(1)(a) provides for an assessment of $130 for felony convictions. This assessment is ‘used to pay for crime victim’s rights services.’” In Carter, a panel of the court recently addressed this same challenge, explaining “that, even if fees, costs, and assessments ordered as part of a sentence are considered ‘fines’ for purposes of an excessive-fines inquiry, that is not the case in every constitutional context.” In Earl, the Michigan Supreme Court explained that “the terms ‘fine’ and ‘assessment’ have different and distinct meanings: criminal fines are generally responsive to the conduct which they intend to punish, while assessments are imposed in accordance with a predetermined flat rate.” The Supreme “Court held that the crime victim’s rights assessment, under MCL 780.905, is imposed at sentencing, but is nonpunitive.” Thus, the court found that here, “the imposition of the $130 payment for the crime victim’s rights fund did not constitute a fine for purposes of” § 9. Finally, it concluded that “for the same reasons, the $68 state minimum in costs does not constitute a fine for the purposes of this” provision. Affirmed.