Action for personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits; Rescission of a policy based on fraudulent misrepresentation; Howard v LM Gen Ins Co; “Owner” (MCL 500.3101(3)(l)(iii)); Findings as to the materiality of the misrepresentation & the injury suffered as a result of it; Whether insurance underwriting rules constitute a “writing” under MRE 1002; Effect of an insurer’s statement that it would not have issued the policy had it known the truth of the vehicles’ ownership; The No-Fault Act (NFA)

Holding that the trial court did not err in granting defendant-insurer’s (CURE) summary disposition motion, “and deeming void ab initio plaintiff’s insurance policy[,]” the court affirmed. He indicated on his insurance application that both a 2016 Lexus and a 2010 Mercedes “were solely owned by and registered to him, and certified the accuracy of those statements. However, a title search performed by CURE revealed that the 2016 Lexus was purchased by, and titled to, plaintiff’s daughter” (nonparty-J). Plaintiff asserted that he “made no knowing misrepresentations on the insurance application because: ‘[T]he purported misrepresentation had nothing to do with the title holder of any vehicle; on the contrary, the application asks only whether the vehicles are solely owned by and registered to the applicant. According to the testimony of Plaintiff and the title holder, Plaintiff was, and always has been, the sole owner and registrant of the Lexus.’” The court found this “disingenuous. At the very least, the available evidence demonstrates no genuine issue of material fact that plaintiff knew he was not the sole owner of either vehicle. While [he] may have made payments on and registered the 2016 Lexus, [J] not only signed the loan to finance the purchase of [it], which left her responsible for any default in payments, but also exclusively held title to” it. The court concluded that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the NFA’s definition of an owner, “along with his deposition testimony that [J] signed the loan for, and held title to, the 2016 Lexus, and that he once owned the 2010 Mercedes, but switched ownership” of it in 2018, showed he “knowingly misrepresented sole ownership in the vehicles.” The court also rejected his challenges to “the trial court’s findings as to the materiality of the misrepresentation and the injury suffered as a result of” it. As to his evidentiary argument based on MRE 1002, he did “not cite to any caselaw holding that insurance underwriting rules constitute a ‘writing’ under MRE 1002” and the court found none. And it noted that “an insurer’s statement that it would not have issued the policy had it known the truth of the vehicles’ ownership is sufficient to establish the materiality of the misrepresentation.” Further, CURE suffered an injury when it “unknowingly assumed an underwriting risk it would not have had plaintiff been forthright as to the” vehicles’ ownership.