Appointed appellate counsel attorney fees; In re Foster Attorney Fees; Reasonable compensation; Recorder’s Court Bar Ass’n v Wayne Circuit Court; Distinguishing In re Ujlaky

Concluding that the trial court’s determination did not fall outside the range of reasonable outcomes, the court affirmed the partial denial of appellant-attorney’s request for attorney fees related to defendant’s appeal. At issue was appellant’s “fourth request for payment, voucher 92108, requesting payment for 27.5 hours of work done between” 7/24 and 9/24. The trial court determined “that the reasonable total amount of time to be reimbursed was 15.8 hours.” But it found the expenses that appellant identified, including for printing and postage, were reasonable. On appeal, appellant relied on Ujlaky. But the court noted that unlike in that case, “the trial court here reviewed voucher 92108 and explicitly considered the reasonableness of the fees in relation to the rendered services. Although [it] referred to the ‘presumptive maximum,’ the trial court’s opinion demonstrates that [it] considered the services rendered in light of the circumstances of the case, rather than reflexively capping payment at 15 hours.” Appellant further argued that it “abused its discretion by determining that the legal services were unreasonable when it had already approved the previous vouchers. It was not improper, however, for the trial court to consider whether the total requested reimbursement was reasonable on the basis of the circumstances of this case. Further, [it] reviewed the requests and services identified on each voucher and approved several payments to [appellant] related to his efforts on behalf of” defendant. Appellant “indicated on appeal that he had never before had a trial court deny him payment, which, instead of demonstrating that the trial court abused its discretion here, suggests that [it] considered the particular services [he] rendered.” Thus, the court held that it “did not abuse its discretion.”