Motion for relief from judgment (MFRJ); Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to call a defense witness; Trial strategy

The court affirmed the trial court’s order denying defendant’s MFRJ. He was convicted of second-degree murder, FIP, and felony-firearm. He argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call defendant’s brother, R, “as a defense witness at trial because, as a result of [R’s] absence, he could not duly pursue his theory of self-defense or the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter. According to defendant, the trial court erred by not awarding him relief on this basis or holding a Ginther hearing on the matter.” The court disagreed. It agreed “with the trial court’s conclusion . . . that defendant has failed to ‘overcome the strong presumption’ that trial counsel’s decision not to call [R] as a witness ‘was born from a sound trial strategy.’” Nor had “defendant overcome the presumption that this strategic decision was objectively reasonable.” The court noted that to further support his ineffective-assistance claim, “defendant recently provided two additional declarations: one from his current appellate counsel, and the other from his mother. None of this was presented previously or below. But even if these declarations were properly submitted on appeal and duly considered by this Court, they too are inadequate to overcome the presumption that trial counsel’s decision not to call [R] as a witness was sound trial strategy.” Because he “failed to show that trial counsel’s performance was deficient, he [was] not entitled to relief on his claim of ineffective assistance.” Thus, the court concluded that “the trial court did not reversibly err by denying this claim when reconsidering it on remand.”