Hostile work environment claim under Title VII & 42 USC § 1981; Prima facie case; Evidence that the alleged harassment was “race-based”; Whether the word “monkey” (when used to describe an African American) is racist; Jordan v City of Cleveland; Effect of one of the alleged harassers being African American; Comparative evidence; Whether discrimination based on color is distinct from discrimination based on race; Evidence that the harassment was “severe & pervasive”

The court held that the African American plaintiffs (Smith and Sneed) presented evidence raising a “genuine issue of material fact as to whether they experienced racial harassment.” It also found that the district court erred by (1) disregarding their comparative evidence based on a “narrow conception of racial identity” and (2) determining “that the racial harassment was insufficiently severe or pervasive.” Finally, defendant-employer did not meet “its burden of proving the first prong of” its affirmative defense. Thus, the court reversed summary judgment for defendant and remanded. Plaintiffs worked as truck drivers for defendant. They were paid a daily rate irrespective of hours or distances driven. They alleged that they were required to work more hours than the non-African American drivers for the same pay, sometimes nearly 70 hours per week. They also claimed that their supervisors referred to them as “monkey” or “monkey ass,” and that despite reporting this, no action was taken. Smith resigned to avoid his treatment. Sneed was fired, purportedly for performance deficiencies, although he was never formerly disciplined before his termination. The district court granted defendant summary judgment. The court disagreed with its ruling that the use of the terms “monkey” and “monkey ass” did not constitute evidence of racial harassment. “Based on well-established precedent across multiple circuits,” the supervisors’ use of these terms “constituted evidence of race-specific harassment.” The court rejected its conclusion that the fact one of the alleged harassers was himself African American obviated the racist nature of the terms. As to the district court’s ruling that their comparative evidence was deficient, the court found its reasoning was “deeply flawed.” By relying on a “narrow conception of racial identity, unadorned by legal precedent, the district court effectively imposed a heightened burden on” plaintiffs beyond that required by Title VII and § 1981. It noted that it “has never held that a plaintiff must proffer evidence of a comparator’s racial self-identification or genetic composition to survive judgment in a Title VII case.” Reviewing the comparative evidence, the court found that the supervisors’ alleged verbal abuse constituted “an additional piece of evidence of racial harassment, and the district court erred by rejecting it.” Further, plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence “to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether they were required to work longer hours, drive lengthier routes, and use damaged trucks, unlike their non-African American counterparts. A reasonable jury could infer, from its racially disparate nature, that this unfavorable treatment was based, at least in part, on race.”