Sufficiency of the evidence; Aggravated stalking; MCL 750.411i; “Stalking”; MCL 750.411i(1)(e); “Harassment”; MCL 750.411i(1)(d); “Emotional distress”; MCL 750.411i(1)(c); Martin v Smith (Unpub); “Reasonable person”; MCL 750.411i; People v Spaulding; Using a computer to commit a crime; MCL 752.797(3)(d)

Concluding that there was insufficient evidence to support defendant’s convictions of aggravated stalking and using a computer to commit a crime, the court reversed his convictions and remanded for entry of judgments of acquittal as to both charges. The court found that “there must be sufficient evidence of conduct by defendant that would cause a reasonable person to experience mental suffering or distress of a kind or at a level that may, but does not necessarily, require medical or other professional treatment or counseling.” M “is a probation agent who was supervising” defendant. The court was required to “determine whether there was sufficient evidence of conduct by defendant that would cause a reasonable person in [M’s] position . . . to suffer ‘emotional distress’ as that term is defined in MCL 750.411i(1)(c).” Turning to the facts of the case, the court found there was not. It agreed “with the trial court that none of defendant’s messages were threatening.” And although “defendant’s text messages were all sent to [M’s] work-issued cell phone, he did not physically approach or follow her, and he did not contact her on a personal device or over social media.” Nor did the court “think that the sheer number, frequency, and length of defendant’s messages would cause a reasonable person in [M’s] position ‘significant mental suffering or distress’ under MCL 750.411i(1)(c).” The prosecution argued that M “should not be expected to have ‘thicker skin or greater patience than a reasonable individual simply by virtue of her occupation.’” The court found that M could not “be held to a higher standard than that of a reasonable individual[,]” however it noted that “the standard under MCL 750.411i(1)(c) is whether defendant’s conduct would cause a reasonable person in [M’s] position to experience ‘significant mental suffering or distress that may, but not necessarily, require medical or other professional treatment or counseling.’ That standard was not met here, so defendant’s conviction for aggravated stalking must be reversed.” The court further found that M’s “occupation and relationship to defendant is also a relevant consideration in the ‘reasonable person’ analysis.” Finally, it found there was insufficient evidence that his “conduct met the definition of stalking under Michigan law.” Thus, the court’s reversal of his “conviction for aggravated stalking mandates reversal of his conviction for using a computer to commit a crime.” The prosecution argued “that even if the evidence were insufficient to convict defendant of aggravated stalking, defendant’s conviction for using a computer to commit a crime should be affirmed.” However, it failed “to explain how the evidence here could sustain the second conviction if it could not sustain the first.” Moreover, it failed “to identify any other ‘crime’ defendant used a computer to commit.”