Termination under §§ 19b(c)(i), (g), & (j); Housing

Concluding that the trial court clearly erred in finding statutory grounds for terminating respondent-mother’s parental rights to her child (KMB) under §§ (c)(i), (g), or (j), the court vacated and remanded. As to § (c)(i), the initial dispositional order was issued in 2021 and the termination proceedings took place in 2024. The trial court originally assumed jurisdiction over the mother “because of domestic violence, substance use, and improper supervision.” While it ordered her “to obtain and maintain suitable housing, housing was not a basis for the trial court taking initial jurisdiction over [her]. Throughout the case, [she] participated in services, including parenting classes and therapy, as well as most of her visitations with KMB, including unsupervised visitations.” As to any domestic abuse against the “mother, ‘such incidents alone are not proper grounds for termination.’” And there was “not clear-and-convincing evidence on this record that there was ongoing violence that warranted termination[.]” As to substance abuse, when “the trial court made its statutory-grounds findings, [mother] had only tested positive for THC, a now-legal substance under Michigan law.” Although she “had missed some of her random-drug screenings” due to scheduling conflicts with her job, a foster care worker “testified that she did not have concerns that [mother] was using other substances or that the marijuana use was impacting her parenting. [Her] positive screen for cocaine after the statutory grounds determination is not particularly relevant when reviewing whether that determination itself was supported by sufficient evidence.” The trial court did not articulate any ground or analysis for terminating her parental rights under § (g), “and for this reason alone, [it] committed clear error with respect to” § (g). As to § (j), the trial court’s findings were “not particularly clear on the reasonable likelihood of harm to KMB. [It] repeatedly identified housing as a barrier for reunification, and the record confirms that housing was a—if not the—trial court’s primary justification for termination.” But there was “little in the record explaining precisely why the motel room was inadequate. The DHHS found the living space to be generally safe and appropriate for the parents’ unsupervised visits with KMB.” Yet, as to living there, it “deemed the space too small for KMB. But other than a bare assertion, the DHHS did not actually demonstrate in the proceedings below or on appeal that the size of the motel room alone justified removal. [Mother] provided unrebutted testimony that she had sufficient space for a toddler bed, she could cook meals, and she had toys and clothing for KMB.” On this record, it was “unclear why the extended-stay motel room was not appropriate, even if the room size might not have been ideal.”