Probable cause for a bindover on hazing charges; MCL 766.13; Constitutionality of Garret’s Law; MCL 750.411t; “Hazing”; MCL 750.411t(7)(b); Principle that consent is not a defense; MCL 750.411t(6); Causation; People v Wood; Freedom of association challenge; NAACP v Button; Equal protection challenge to athletic-program exception; People v Martinez; Vagueness & overbreadth challenges; People v Rogers; As-applied First Amendment challenge as to expressive conduct; Scope of a law; People v Otto
Noting that this was the first case in which it addressed the statute, the court held that the district court properly bound defendant over on Garret’s Law hazing charges and that the statute is constitutional, facially and as applied. Defendant, a fraternity “pledge master,” was charged in the death of one pledge and injuries to three others. The district court bound him over, and the circuit court denied his constitutional motion. On appeal, the court first affirmed the bindover, finding the district court had probable cause. “Organizing a party at which one knows fraternity pledges will be pressured to drink to excess—which defendant knew, to the extent that he asked that the fraternity ‘wait until I get there before they’re dead’—is ‘an intentional, knowing, or reckless act . . . directed against’ the victims, and there is sufficient record support that defendant ‘knew or should have known’ it would ‘endanger[] the physical health or safety of’ the victims. There is probable cause to support this element.” Further, whether he “personally directed each instance of ‘scrolling’ or not, his leadership role supports a finding that he was responsible for the collective pressure imposed on the victims. Because that pressure ‘result[ed] in’ the injuries suffered, that element too is supported by probable cause.” Turning to the constitutional challenges, the court rejected defendant’s freedom of association claim, noting Garret’s Law targets harmful conduct, not protected group expression. The protection “does not extend to conduct that deliberately or recklessly endangers the physical health or safety of current or prospective members.” His equal protection attack on the statute’s carve-out for “normal and customary” athletic or similar programs also failed as such programs “inherently involve physicality that might otherwise seem hazardous, yet they serve legitimate purposes and are subject to institutional oversight.” The court also rejected his vagueness and overbreadth arguments, noting that “‘a statute need not define an offense with mathematical certainty’” and that terms like “reckless” and “endanger” are routinely applied. Further, his as-applied challenge was meritless because this prosecution targeted conduct rather than speech. “This is not a case of punishing protected speech.” Finally, the court explained that applying Garret’s Law here does not stretch it beyond its purpose. “The conduct charged is precisely the type of behavior Garret’s Law was intended to address[.]” Affirmed.
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