Sentencing; Denial of a reduction in base offense level for “acceptance of responsibility”; USSG §§ 3E1.1(a)–(b) & Cmt. n.1(A); Whether any error in the district court’s application of Note 1(A)’s “specific definition of ‘relevant conduct’” would make its final decision “clearly erroneous”

[This appeal was from the WD-MI.] The court held that the district court did not err by denying defendant-Jett a sentence reduction for “acceptance of responsibility” based on his drug possession and attempted smuggling while incarcerated. Jett pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute meth. During the three years between when he committed the crime and his arrest, he had no encounters with law enforcement. But after his arrest, he attempted to smuggle drugs into jail and get them from other inmates. Also, drugs were discovered in his cell. At the PSR interview, Jett, after consultation with counsel, denied responsibility for smuggling a drug known as K2 into jail. He later indicated he would admit to the smuggling but then changed his mind again “and his counsel notified the government that Jett did not intend to admit responsibility for the K2.” A new PSR recommended that Jett be denied the reduction. He argued for the reduction at sentencing, but the district court denied it based on the evidence of his drug activity while incarcerated. On appeal, Jett argued that it erred by denying him the reduction for what he characterized as “irrelevant conduct.” The court noted that “Application Notes to § 3E1.1 offer a non-exclusive list of factors that a district court may treat as ‘appropriate considerations’ in deciding whether a defendant has accepted responsibility.” It held that the district court properly relied on Jett’s acts related to the K2 and his repeated denials regarding his actions. The district court referenced Note 1(A) (false denial) and the actual Guideline itself to support its decision. The court noted that it has previously rejected reductions for acceptance of responsibility “to defendants who engaged in conduct similar to the offense of conviction while awaiting the entry of a plea or sentencing.” It further noted that “caselaw forecloses the conclusion that a defendant is entitled to a reduction for acceptance of responsibility merely because he has pleaded guilty.” Also, the court did not see why the three-year gap between his meth offense “and his K2 infractions would, as a matter of law, render” those infractions irrelevant. While “a substantial period of crime-free living could” perhaps be significant evidence of contrition, when, “as here, the defendant’s conduct after indictment casts doubt on the defendant’s expression of repentance, the district court is entitled to take that into account when weighing whether the defendant has accepted responsibility.” The court added that “any error in applying Note 1(A)’s specific definition of ‘relevant conduct’ did not make the district court’s ultimate conclusion ‘clearly erroneous.’” Affirmed.