Subject-matter jurisdiction on limited remand following challenges to pandemic orders; MCL 333.2253; Johnson v White; Law-of-the-case & scope of remand barring relitigation of merits; Rott v Rott; Mootness/vacatur of a prior ruling on MCL 333.2253; Authority to award indemnification for contempt losses; MCL 600.1721; In re Bradley Estate; Whether a state agency qualifies as a “person” for indemnification; MCL 8.3l; In re Contempt of McRipley; Recovery of costs & attorney fees tied to contemptuous misconduct; MCL 600.1701(g); In re Contempt of Henry

The court held that the trial court properly refashioned the second contempt sanction to compensate appellee-Department of Agriculture for losses caused by appellant-restaurant owner’s defiance of the suspension of a food license and correctly limited compensation to the already-paid $7,500. Appellee summarily suspended appellant’s restaurant food license during COVID-19, but she kept operating in violation of a TRO and preliminary injunction, leading to two contempt findings, jail, and two $7,500 fines. In a prior appeal, the court affirmed contempt but remanded solely to refashion the second fine to be civil in nature. On remand, the trial court found appellee incurred enforcement costs and directed payment from the second fine. It later clarified that appellee’s compensation could not exceed $7,500. On appeal, the court rejected appellants’ renewed subject-matter-jurisdiction challenges because the remand was limited and the merits of contempt were already resolved. The trial court “did not enter a new contempt order. Rather, it refashioned an existing contempt order” in accordance with the remand instructions. The court emphasized the law-of-the-case and the rule that “‘a contempt proceeding does not open to reconsideration the legal or factual basis of the order alleged to have been disobeyed’” and reiterated that parties must “‘obey court orders regardless of their validity.’” The court further noted that any reliance on an earlier ruling declaring MCL 333.2253 unconstitutional failed because the Supreme Court had since vacated that holding. Turning to indemnification, the court upheld recovery under MCL 600.1721 where the record showed actual losses (including attorney time) caused by the contempt. It explained that the statute “simply mandates that the [trial] court must indemnify a party for the contempt of the other party if that contempt caused actual loss or injury,” that the word “‘person’ includes public bodies,” and that fees are recoverable in contempt. Affirmed.