Right to a speedy trial; People v Williams; Motion to suppress postarrest statements as involuntary; People v Stewart; A detective’s threats; Harmless error; Jail credit; MCL 769.11b; People v Idziak; People v Prieskorn

The court held that the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to dismiss based on his constitutional right to a speedy trial. Further, the record supported the trial court’s rejection of several of his claims related to his motion to suppress his postarrest statements. While some statements should have been suppressed due to threats, reversal was “not warranted because the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Finally, Idziak and Prieskorn foreclosed his claim as to jail credit. He was convicted of armed robbery, carrying a weapon with unlawful intent, and felony-firearm. As to his right to a speedy trial, given the 27-month delay, the first Williams factor weighed in his favor, but the court found that the presumption of prejudice was “rebutted after considering the remaining factors.” Concerning the second factor, the reason for the delay, his trial was initially scheduled for 1/7/20 and later adjourned to 3/24/20. Consistent with directives related to the COVID-19 pandemic, it “was repeatedly adjourned until [9/7/21], when a final pretrial was held and a November trial date was scheduled.” While he asserted that some adjournments were not adequately explained, “the register of actions reflects that the postponements were largely at the behest of the trial court due to pandemic restrictions. The remainder of the adjournments have not been shown to be unexplained or inexcusable such that they should be meaningfully attributed to the prosecution.” The assertion of the right factor weighed in defendant’s favor. But as to the fourth factor, there was “no identifiable prejudice to his defense arising from the delay.” As to his cited “personal hardships,” the court noted that “‘anxiety alone cannot establish a speedy-trial violation’” and the fact he did not “accrue jail credit in this case was a consequence of” his parole status, not the delay. As to his motion to suppress, his “education, intoxication, and physical condition did not overbear his will or render his statements the product of coercion.” While the court found that all statements from a point in the interrogation forward should have been excluded due a detective’s threats, “by that point, defendant had already made” several inculpatory admissions. Given those “admissions and the unequivocal eyewitness testimony, it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have convicted him even without the erroneously admitted statements.” Affirmed.