The Sixth Amendment right to self-representation; Inquiry into the breakdown of an attorney-client relationship; Whether defendant’s motion appropriately put the district court on notice that he was dissatisfied with his counsel & wanted a change; Principle that a defendant must be permitted to make important decisions as to the direction of his case regardless of whether he is represented; Benitez v United States; “Hybrid representation”; United States v Liggin

[This appeal was from the ED-MI.] The court held that the district court erred by rejecting defendant-Riley’s motion for reconsideration asserting that he was proceeding pro se because his counsel had agreed to a resentence stipulation without his knowledge and against his wishes. The court concluded his motion was sufficient to “put the district court on notice that he was dissatisfied with his counsel and wanted a change.” It was “not improper hybrid representation; it was a defendant’s proper assertion of dissatisfaction with his representation.” He was sentenced to 160 months after he pled guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute controlled substances. Amendment 821 to the Guidelines later gave him a new range of 121 to 151 months. He “received a public defender to represent him in resentencing proceedings.” His counsel and the government stipulated that Riley was entitled to resentencing and recommended a 144-month sentence, to which the district court agreed. Riley later filed a motion for reconsideration, purporting “to appear ‘in his pro-se litigant capacity.’” He alleged that his attorney had agreed to the sentence without his knowledge or consent, and argued that he should be sentenced to time served. The district court denied his motion without reaching the merits of his claims. On appeal, the court explained that if there is “a breakdown in the attorney/client relationship” a defendant may move to replace counsel, or to proceed pro se. The district court must then “inquire into the reasons for, and nature of, the defendant’s dissatisfaction with counsel and to replace or dismiss counsel if necessary.” The court noted that it has held that “a defendant is not required to make an explicit request . . . .” But not every disagreement about strategy “rises to the necessary level.” Riley claimed that his counsel “made a decision affecting the overarching aims of the representation without his knowledge or assent.” He had the right to decide whether to accept or reject the sentence disposition offered by the government even if he was represented by counsel. His motion was sufficient to give rise to an obligation by the district court “to determine whether the attorney-client relationship had in fact fractured, and, if so, what further action was necessary.” Riley’s motion did not constitute hybrid representation to the extent he “raised an antecedent issue about his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation: whether his attorney had entered a stipulation on his behalf, without his consent.” The court vacated the district court’s judgment on his motion and remanded “for the district court to conduct the proper inquiry into whether Riley wishes to dismiss his counsel and whether he is entitled to do so[,]” and to proceed accordingly.