Class certification; FedRCivP 23(b)(3); Whether the class members had standing; TransUnion LLC v Ramirez; Breach of contract as a “concrete injury” for standing purposes; Whether undergoing appraisals mooted their claims; Whether the putative class satisfied the Rule 23(a) requirements; Whether the named plaintiff’s claims were “typical” of the class; Adequate class representative; “Predominance” prong of Rule 23(b)(3); Superiority; Rule 23’s implicit “ascertainability” requirement

The court held that the district court did not err by certifying the class in this case for contract breach. It rejected defendant-State Farm’s argument that the putative class members lacked standing, concluding that “even without a claim of damages, breach of contract is a concrete injury in fact for standing purposes.” It also found that the class satisfied all seven prerequisites under Rule 23. Plaintiff-Clippinger was in an accident, and her car was a total loss. She initiated this class action, challenging State Farm’s method of calculating the “actual cash value” of a vehicle. State Farm contended that her “breach of contract claim stemming from the alleged underpayment in the initial valuation had been resolved by” payment after an “appraisal, and thus her action could no longer be maintained.” The district court certified a class made up of State Farm-insured Tennessee plaintiffs. Relying on TransUnion, State Farm argued that the putative class lacked standing because “a purported breach which does not ultimately lead to damages cannot be a breach in the first place—and thus no injury has occurred.” But the court explained that this was not a “standing argument” but was instead “a theory of the contracts at issue in the case,” going to the actual merits. The court held “that private rights created by valid contracts between private parties are the kind of rights that have traditionally been cognizable in American courts.” It further found that to “the extent State Farm argues that Clippinger lacks standing only after appraisal, its argument is based on mootness and not standing.” It noted that State Farm did “not make a mootness argument and likely would not prevail if it had.” Turning to Rule 23(a)’s requirements, the court rejected State Farm’s argument “that Clippinger’s claims are not typical of the class because, after undergoing appraisal, her individual case is no longer affected by any erroneous initial valuation.” It concluded she was “still a member of the class because she is still seeking a finding of liability for the same alleged breach as the rest of the class.” As to Rule 23(b)’s requirements, the court found that “State Farm’s predominance arguments are unsuccessful for similar reasons as are its typicality arguments.” Further, the court upheld the district court’s determination that a class action in this case “is superior to other forms of litigation or resolution.” And State Farm did “not contest ascertainability on appeal.” The court affirmed the certification order and remanded for further proceedings.