Prosecutorial error based on uncorrected false testimony; People v Smith; Voluntary-manslaughter instruction (heat of passion, adequate provocation, cooling time); People v Yeager; Self-defense imminence; MCL 780.972(1)(a); Ineffective assistance of counsel

The court held that there was no due-process violation, no instructional error, and no ineffective assistance. Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, FIP, and felony-firearm after he chased the victim (the ex-boyfriend of his girlfriend, S) from an apartment complex, stopped the car, pursued on foot, and shot the victim. Defendant was later arrested with the murder weapon. S, who was charged with being an accessory after the fact to a felony, pled guilty to that charge before defendant’s trial. On appeal, the court rejected his claim that the prosecutor failed to correct false testimony about S’s plea agreement, noting S testified she pled guilty to accessory-after-the-fact and agreed to cooperate. When defense counsel suggested she received a reduced plea deal, “she stated this was incorrect.” The court noted that due process requires correction when testimony about consideration creates a false impression, but here S’s “testimony did not create a false impression regarding the terms of her plea agreement[.]” S was truthful that she pled guilty in exchange for her testimony, so no correction was required. The court also upheld the denial of a voluntary-manslaughter instruction, reasoning the record did not show adequate provocation. It explained that Yeager did not alter the outcome as the trial court denied the instruction “because there was no adequate provocation,” not because defendant’s passion had to be anger. Finally, the ineffective-assistance claims failed. As to the undisclosed plea paperwork, the record did not show deficient investigation. Counsel questioned S about consideration, and the plea terms were available on the public docket. As to the hearsay ruling when counsel asked what S told defendant about the victim, even assuming deficiency, defendant could not show prejudice because the proffered statements would not establish imminence for self-defense. “A defendant must still reasonably believe deadly force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm,” and defendant “never saw [the victim] with a weapon,” fired while the victim was running away, and fired again while he was on the ground. Affirmed.