Constitutional right to a speedy trial; People v Smith; Barker v Wingo; Whether defendant was prejudiced by the delay; Overcoming the presumption of prejudice due to an over 18-month delay

The court held that the trial court did not clearly err in ruling that, despite “the two-year delay between defendant’s arrest and trial, he was not prejudiced, and dismissal was not warranted.” He was convicted of second-degree murder and other crimes. The court previously “rejected some of his challenges but remanded to the trial court to determine whether he was deprived of his constitutional right to a speedy trial.” He now appealed the trial court’s order declining to dismiss the case. The first and third Barker factors were undisputed. Both weighed “in defendant’s favor, as the trial court found.” As to the second factor, the court rejected his claim that all the pretrial delay was attributable to the prosecution. While, as the trial court found, most of it was, “there was no evidence of bad faith. Indeed, defendant has never contended that any delay was because of bad faith, and at one point below, he even conceded that the prosecution was acting diligently. Furthermore, one of the delays was outside the control of the parties or the trial court because there was a judicial vacancy and no judge had been appointed. The trial court did not clearly err by weighing this factor only modestly in defendant’s favor.” As to the fourth, and most important, factor – whether the delay prejudiced defendant – the court held “that the trial court did not clearly err by finding” it did not. The record affirmatively showed that his “person was not prejudiced by the delay. When the victim was shot, defendant was on parole for other crimes, and he was incarcerated for violating that parole. The trial court found that ‘defendant likely would have been in prison during this period anyway,’ and that finding is not clearly erroneous.” The court also determined that given the trial court’s findings, which were not clearly erroneous, it “correctly concluded that defendant’s defense was not prejudiced. The practical issue of fact at trial was the identity of the shooter.” Only one witness could identify the shooter, and his identification “was supported by objective circumstantial evidence, including a cell phone, a gun case, and defendant’s fingerprints. This type of evidence was not the kind . . . that would decay.” The court noted that “the only potential prejudice was the absence of a witness who could not have helped the defense.” Thus, the record overcame the presumption of prejudice, and he did not carry “his ultimate burden of establishing prejudice.”