First Amendment free speech claim under 42 USC § 1983; Free speech rights in schools; Tinker v Des Moines Indep Cmty Sch Dist; The vulgar speech exception to the Tinker standard; Regulation of political speech without vulgar words that a school reasonably understands as having a vulgar message; Mahanoy Area Sch Dist v BL ex rel Levy; Bethel Sch Dist No 403 v Fraser; Prohibited speech that is both political & vulgar

[This appeal was from the WD-MI.] The court held that the district court did not err by granting defendants-school district and administrators summary judgment in this First Amendment free-speech case because “the school reasonably understood the slogan ‘Let’s Go Brandon’ to be vulgar.” The case arose after the school prohibited plaintiffs-school children “from wearing sweatshirts that bore the message “Let’s Go Brandon.” Through their mother, they sued defendants, claiming that they violated the students’ free-speech rights by not allowing them to wear the sweatshirts to school. Defendants offered testimony that the dress code did not “prevent students from wearing clothing that expressed political statements so long as it didn’t violate the dress code.” The court first discussed the Tinker standard under which “the school has the burden of showing that it reasonably believes its regulation of student speech will prevent substantial and material interference with school functions.” It noted there are exceptions to Tinker’s standard. One of those exceptions is that, on “school grounds, a school may generally prohibit (1) indecent, lewd, and vulgar speech[.]” The court found that this case was about that exception and “how a school may regulate political speech without vulgar words that the school nonetheless reasonably understands as having a vulgar message.” Plaintiffs argued that the message “‘Let’s Go Brandon’ is not profane.” But the Supreme Court’s decision in Fraser demonstrated “that a school may regulate speech that conveys an obscene or vulgar message even when the words used are not themselves obscene or vulgar.” As to the question of who decides what is vulgar, the court found that precedent was “clear; Fraser puts a thumb on the scale in favor of the school administrators. And here the uncontroverted origin of the slogan shows a plainly vulgar meaning.” The court then considered whether a “slogan’s political valence affords it greater protection than nonpolitical vulgarity.” It concluded that Fraser answered “this question by holding that vulgarity trumps the political aspect of speech at school.” Thus, the court concluded that requesting students remove clothing with the slogan here “didn’t violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments.” Affirmed.