Reasonable reunification efforts; MCL 712A.19a(2)(a); Whether aggravated circumstances existed; MCL 722.638(1); “Serious physical harm” (MCL 750.136b); The clear & convincing evidence standard

Holding that the trial court’s finding that aggravated circumstances existed pursuant to MCL 712A.19a was clearly erroneous, the court vacated the order terminating respondent-father’s parental rights and remanded for further proceedings, including reasonable reunification efforts. While he pled “no-contest to biting, pinching, and squeezing the child, he” asserted the abuse “did not include a fractured rib.” Specifically, he argued “that evidence admitted in the trial court did not constitute clear and convincing evidence that he caused the rib fracture suffered by the child. Thus, [he] essentially argues that the allegations to which he pleaded no-contest, biting, pinching and squeezing the child, none of which required medical treatment, do not meet the requirements for aggravating circumstances under MCL 712A.19a(2)(a).” One such circumstance is “serious physical harm.” The court noted that under “MCL 750.136b, a broken rib falls within the definition of ‘serious physical harm.’” But it concluded that the DHHS here “did not prove with clear and convincing evidence that respondent caused the child’s broken rib.” It noted that the “only evidence of a causal link between the rib fracture and” respondent’s behavior came from the testimony of a doctor, “who said, in his opinion, the rib fracture was caused by abuse and all the abuse was most likely caused by the father. That testimony, by itself, does not meet the burden of clear and convincing evidence.” Even if the DHHS did not prove “that respondent caused the rib fracture, if all of the evidence, considered together, constituted clear and convincing evidence of aggravating circumstances under MCL 712A19a(2)(a), [the court] would be required to affirm the trial court’s finding in that regard.” But the court was “left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake was made.” Considering the totality of the circumstances, including the injuries respondent admitted “to causing as a result of biting, squeezing, and pinching the child (none of which required any medical treatment),” the court found that aggravated circumstances did not exist in this case, “meaning reasonable efforts towards reunification should have been made by the trial court, including the ordering of services.”