Removal; Motion to reopen removal proceedings to seek relief allowing petitioner to voluntarily depart; 8 USC § 1229c(b)(1); Requirements; § 1229c(b)(1)(A)-(D); The court’s jurisdiction to review denial of a request for voluntary departure; §§ 1229c(f) & 1252(a)(2)(B)(i); Motions to reopen; § 1229a(c)(7)(A)

The court denied petitioner-Pastor-Hernandez’s petition for review where he failed to include any factual details to support his conclusory statement that he was in the process of seeking a new passport, thus failing to establish a prima facie case for voluntary departure. He was ordered removed from the United States, but he moved to reopen proceedings so that he could leave voluntarily. This would require that he show that was able to travel to Guatemala (the “means to depart” requirement in § 1229c(b)(1)). This in turn would require him to have a Guatemalan passport, which he did not possess. He argued that he was in the process of obtaining one but did not offer any evidence to support that claim. As a result, the Board of Immigration Appeals denied his motion to reopen. The court noted that his petition to review required it “to describe the interaction between two immigration provisions: the provision governing voluntary departure and the provision governing motions to reopen.” Under the voluntary departure provision, the court cannot review “any factual findings underlying the denial or any discretionary decision that an immigrant did not warrant this relief.” But the court held that “Pastor-Hernandez’s challenge to the denial of his motion to reopen does not raise the type of question that we would lack jurisdiction to consider. For example, [he] does not challenge the Board’s factual finding that he did not have a valid Guatemalan passport when he filed his motion.” In addition, the “Board did not deny his request for voluntary departure as a discretionary matter.” Rather, he raised “a ‘question[] of law’ about the Board’s ruling.” He contended it “committed a purely legal error because it required him to conclusively prove (not merely create a prima facie case) that he could meet this means-to-depart element at the motion-to-reopen stage.” The court rejected this characterization of the Board’s findings where it specifically stated that he had to “establish only ‘prima facie eligibility for the relief sought’ at this stage.” The court also found that the Board’s resolution did not reveal any mistake of law where Pastor-Hernandez’s “failure to submit basic ‘evidence’ in support of his claim ‘raised questions about whether’ he could ultimately meet the requirements for voluntary departure.” Thus, the Board “did not commit a legal error by finding he did not establish a prima facie case even assuming Pastor-Hernandez’s view that he could rely on future facts.”