Motion for Special Immigrant Juvenile (SIJ) findings; In re Velasquez; 8 USC § 1101(a)(27)(J); 8 CFR § 204.11; Juvenile’s best interests; MCL 722.23 & 710.22(g); Standard of proof; Appointment of a foreign language interpreter; MCR 1.111; In re Guardianship of DRRR

While the trial court applied the correct preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, the court held that it abused its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion for SIJ findings. The court made the predicate factual findings relevant to the juvenile’s (DARL) SIJ status and determined that she satisfied the criteria. Thus, it vacated the trial court’s order denying petitioner’s motion for SIJ status and remanded for entry of the court’s special findings as to DARL’s SIJ status. On appeal, the court first rejected petitioner’s claim that the trial court erred in rescheduling the “motion hearing due to interpreter unavailability, instead of allowing a virtual language interpreting service.” It noted that in contrast to DRRR, while the trial court here “initially failed to procure an interpreter, [it] took care to conduct the SIJ hearing with the requisite interpreter and make its determinations before DARL reached the age of majority. Therefore, any initial failure to secure an interpreter at DARL’s SIJ hearing did not deny her meaningful access to justice.” As to the denial of the motion for SIJ findings, the court looked to the SIJ status criteria and found a preponderance of the evidence established “that: (1) DARL was declared dependent upon the State of Michigan Kent Circuit Court by virtue of guardianship proceedings, resulting in the appointment of petitioner as her temporary guardian until DARL reached 18 years of age; (2) DARL’s reunification with her father is not viable because of her father’s neglect, abuse, and abandonment of DARL; and (3) DARL’s best interests would not be served by returning to her country of origin, Guatemala.” The court concluded a preponderance of the evidence showed “DARL’s father neglected and abused DARL and her mother,” to the extent that they fled from him. It was “definitely and firmly convinced that the trial court made a mistake by finding that reunification with DARL’s father was viable.” Further, because the statute only requires “that reunification with one parent is not viable,” the court’s findings as to the father were “sufficient to satisfy the statutory requirement.” It also concluded that, whether “‘using the child custody factors, adoption factors, or a combination of factors,’ a preponderance of the evidence supports our finding that it is not in DARL’s best interests to return to Guatemala.” Finally, the court found “that the trial court made an error of law when it determined that the SIJ process was not intended for minors like DARL.”