Change of domicile; Rains v Rains; Best interests; MCL 722.23; Threshold proof & temporal scope; Vodvarka v Grasmeyer; Attorney fees; MCR 3.206(D)(2)(a) & (b); Ability to bear the expense of the action; Ability to pay; Misconduct; Motion to compel discovery; Discovery scope; MCR 3.215(F)(2)

The court held that the trial court properly changed the child’s domicile and correctly denied plaintiff-mother’s attorney fee and discovery requests. Applying Rains, the court noted the mother did not contest proper-cause or change-of-circumstances. It rejected her claim that the trial court relied on “outdated” evidence as to best interests, noting Vodvarka’s timing limits pertain to the threshold showing and do not bar relevant history in the best-interests phase. It found that evidence of her “prior behavior was relevant, and necessary, to determine whether she continued to make poor decisions” about the child’s medical issues, among other things. The court reviewed the best-interest factor and deferred to the trial court’s credibility findings. It found factors (b), (d), (e), (f), (g), and (j) equal, and that (c) favored defendant-father. Rejecting the mother’s tally the factors argument, the court reiterated that trial courts may weigh factors differently and must decide the child’s best interests. Here, the trial court permissibly placed “great weight” on factor (c) and concluded the child should live primarily with father “so [he] could continue to receive appropriate and regular medical and dental care,” while retaining joint legal custody to ensure equal access to information. Any error in conducting the referee hearings by Zoom was harmless. The judge reviewed the record from the 30 referee hearings, took live testimony, made independent findings (disagreeing with the referee on multiple factors), and interviewed the child. As to attorney fees, the court affirmed denial under MCR 3.206(D)(2)(a) because the mother did not show the father was able to pay. He had only nominal substitute-teaching income and was otherwise unemployed. Compelling fees would in effect compel a nonparty to pay, as his spouse (not a party) paid household expenses and bills. Denial under MCR 3.206(D)(2)(b) was also affirmed. Fees must be “incurred because” of defiance or discovery abuse. While the father’s notice of urgent-care visits was imperfect, the referee and judge found no willful refusal, both parties contributed to the proceedings’ length, and the trial court had already sanctioned the father twice for discrete violations. The discovery rulings were also proper under MCR 3.215(F)(2). The court upheld the order partially denying plaintiff’s motion to compel discovery. The argument as to a subpoena to the court reporting firm was waived when counsel agreed the trial court could take judicial notice. Affirmed.