Motor-vehicle exception to governmental immunity; MCL 691.1405; Alex v Wildfong; Employee immunity; Gross negligence; MCL 691.1407(2)(c); Statutory definition of parking & loading exception; MCL 257.38; Bensinger v Happyland Shows, Inc; Comparative fault; MCL 500.3135(4)(a); Negligence per se; Inference of negligence; Zeni v Anderson; Lane change duty to ascertain safety; MCL 257.642(1)(a); Proximate cause; Klanseck v Anderson Sales & Serv, Inc

Holding that plaintiff was not illegally parked because Michigan’s statutory definition of parking excludes loading, and that any statutory violations would create only an inference of negligence for the factfinder to weigh under comparative fault, the court reversed as to defendant-SMART and remanded while affirming dismissal as to defendant-Pace. Plaintiff pulled into a marked bus stop to pick up her adult daughter and stopped with her foot on the brake as the daughter began to board. A SMART bus attempted to enter the stop and its rear clipped plaintiff’s car. The trial court granted summary disposition for defendants on the ground that plaintiff was negligent as a matter of law for stopping in the bus zone. On appeal, the court rejected the negligence per se ruling, explaining that a statutory violation “creates only a prima facie case from which the jury may draw an inference of negligence” and that “it is the jury’s duty to decide, as a matter of fact, whether the violation was a proximate cause of the accident.” Turning to the parking statute, the court held that the near century-old definition of parking contains “a critical exception for ‘loading or unloading,’” and because SMART conceded plaintiff “had her foot on the brake and was helping to load her passenger,” she was by definition not parked under MCL 257.38 and did not violate MCL 257.674(1). As to the Uniform Traffic Code’s bus stop provision, the court noted that it allows a temporary stop for expeditious loading “if the stopping does not interfere with any bus or taxicab waiting to enter or about to enter the zone,” and whether plaintiff interfered is a question of fact. The court emphasized that allocation of fault belongs to the jury under comparative fault and that reasonable minds could differ about who was more to blame. Finally, because counsel conceded that plaintiff did not allege gross negligence against the driver summary disposition for Pace was appropriate.