Election-related motion for mandamus & declaratory relief; Barrow v Detroit City Election Comm’n; Interpretation of city Charter provisions; Whether the Charter conflicted with MCL 168.737a; MCL 168.321(1); Whether plaintiff satisfied the Charter’s residency requirement; The court’s jurisdiction; “Final order”; Treating an appeal as a granted application for leave to appeal; Department of Elections (DOE)

The court held that plaintiff-King was “ineligible to be elected to the office she” sought because she could not meet “the voter-registration requirement of Detroit City Charter, § 2-101.” Thus, she was not entitled to a writ of mandamus or declaratory relief. King sought to represent a district on the City’s Board of Police Commissioners, and filed a declaration of intent to seek the office as a write-in candidate. The City’s DOE informed her that she was disqualified from being a write-in candidate because she was not a resident of the district for one year before filing for office. She later filed this action. The trial court denied her motion for mandamus and declaratory relief. On appeal, the court first considered whether it had jurisdiction. It found that while the trial court “adjudicated King’s motion, the complaint itself” was still pending in the trial court. Thus, the order here was not a “final order” or “final judgment” and the court lacked “jurisdiction over the claim of appeal.” But it exercised its discretion to treat the appeal as a granted application for leave. Turning to the merits, the court agreed with the trial court “that the Charter language controls and that a plain application of that language to the facts shows that King is simply not eligible to be elected to the office she seeks given when she registered to vote at the LaSalle address.” The court reviewed its decision in Barrow, which was also an election-related dispute involving the Detroit City Charter. It noted that “Barrow is different from the present case in that, while Duggan was running for an at-large office (Mayor), in this case, King seeks to run for a non-at-large (i.e., district) office.” The Charter provision at issue, § 2-101, provides that “any person seeking office from a non at-large district must be a resident and qualified, registered voter in such district for one (1) year at the time of filing for office[.]” King did not “explain how she satisfies this language given when she registered to vote in” the district (three days before she filed for office). The court rejected her argument based on MCL 168.737a. “In light of the plain language of MCL 168.321(1), there is no conflict between any statute and § 2-101 of the Charter.” It also found no conflict between § 2-101 and another Charter provision, § 7-802. Affirmed.