Statute of frauds writing requirement; MCL 566.108; Zurcher v Herveat; One-year provision writing requirement; MCL 566.132(1)(a); Easement essential terms; Greve v Caron; Electronic signature; MCL 450.837(4); Meeting of the minds; Kloian v Domino’s Pizza LLC

Holding that the parties formed an enforceable contract and that the statute of frauds was satisfied by writings electronically signed through counsel, the court affirmed the judgment ordering specific performance and entering declaratory relief. Neighboring property owners negotiated conditions tied to plaintiffs’ special-use permit request, including repaving, a dumpster enclosure, a perpetual shared-access easement, cost sharing for waste removal, and three years of shared landscaping. The township approved the permit “Subject to the Following Conditions,” including “the agreement between [plaintiffs] and [defendants].” The trial court found a binding contract and specified deadlines and logistics to implement performance. On appeal, the court held the statute of frauds was met because the emails contained the essential terms and counsel adopted them. It explained that under MCL 450.837(4), if “a law requires a signature, an electronic signature satisfies the law.” Further, whether a record is signed is a question of fact, and it noted counsel’s statements that the “terms you noted below are correct” and that “we do not need an agreement.” As to the easement, the court concluded the agreement to a “perpetual recorded easement for shared dumpster access” was sufficiently definite because the trial court could supply precise contours and “render[] the easement ‘capable of determinate location under a common sense view of the grant.’” Addressing mutual assent, the court cited an email setting out five terms and plaintiffs’ point-by-point assent, finding a meeting of the minds judged by “‘the express words of the parties and their visible acts[.]’” Finally, the court upheld the trial court’s equitable authority to add reasonable implementation details and new dates where the original ones had expired, explaining that, so “‘long as the essentials are defined by the parties themselves, the law supplies the missing details by construction.’”