Other acts evidence; MRE 404(b); People v VanderVliet; Relevance; Motive; Premeditation & deliberation; MRE 403; People v Blackston; Sufficiency of the evidence for a first-degree premeditated murder conviction; People v Oros

Holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting other acts evidence and that there was sufficient evidence to support defendant’s first-degree premeditated murder conviction, the court affirmed. The prosecution offered the evidence that defendant had used the victim’s (L) credit card to support its theory as to “motive and intent, specifically that [L] had broken up with defendant upon discovering he had used her card to purchase 300 dollars of phone sex. The prosecution offered the evidence that defendant had made an obscene phone call three days after [L’s] disappearance to show that defendant owned, and had destroyed, the cellular phone that had called the phone sex line . . . and had made inconsistent or contradictory statements to police about how many” cell phones and numbers he had, showing consciousness of guilt. The court concluded “the trial court did not err by holding that the prosecution had offered the evidence for a proper, non-propensity purpose.” As to relevance and the evidence that he used L’s “card to purchase phone sex, and that she had ended the relationship as a result, evidence of motive is always relevant in a criminal prosecution, and other-acts evidence may be admitted if relevant to prove motive.” Further, evidence that he had a cell phone that he did not initially disclose “to the police investigating [L’s] disappearance, that he had given inconsistent statements to police” about his cell “phone ownership and use, and had destroyed that phone a few days after [L’s] disappearance, was relevant to the issue of” his cell “phone ownership and use and to explain the investigation into [L’s] disappearance.” The court also held that the evidence was properly not excluded under MRE 403. It further concluded that, while circumstantial, the “evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, would enable a rational jury to conclude that defendant had caused [L’s] death.” The prosecution presented “more than evidence that defendant knew [L] was dead—circumstantial evidence linking [him] to the area where [L’s] personal items were recovered, and [his] post-offense behavior, support the conclusion that [he] had killed” her. The evidence also “fairly permitted the jury’s inference of premeditation and deliberation.”