Accrual of § 1983 procedural-due-process claim; Wallace v Kato; Statutory 3-year limitations period under MCL 600.5805; Cataldo v US Steel Corp; Effect of prior federal filing on tolling; MCL 600.5856; Heard v Strange; Adequacy of pre- and post-termination procedures § 1983; Cleveland Bd of Educ v Loudermill; Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC)

[This appeal was from the WD-MI.] The court held that because plaintiff-Bozzo’s § 1983 claim was “untimely on its face,” and he could not establish an exception to the statute of limitations, the district court properly dismissed his procedural due process claim. Bozzo, who worked for the MDOC as a prison guard, was discharged for comments to a co-worker. Years after an arbitrator ruled for the MDOC, he sued in federal court alleging various constitutional violations. The district court dismissed his first case without prejudice when he failed to respond to a motion to dismiss. He then refiled, and the district court granted defendants-MDOC officials’ renewed motion to dismiss based on the statute of limitations and his forfeiture of all his constitutional claims except due process, for which he had failed to state a claim. On appeal, he only pursued his procedural due process claim and argued his case should not have been dismissed based on the statute of limitations. The court explained that § 1983 claims borrow the applicable state law limitations period for personal-injury actions, which under Michigan law is three years, and that federal law governs accrual. It reiterated that in this circuit “a claim accrues when a ‘plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of his action,’” noted the “apparent contradiction between the Supreme Court’s occurrence-based rule and our discovery rule,” and, because the parties assumed the discovery rule applied, “t[ook] the case as presented.” Considering the elements of a due process claim, it held that his alleged deprivation occurred when he was “formally terminated” via correspondence on 7/31/19, and that his alleged procedural injuries continued only through his post-termination arbitration hearing, which ended on 12/17/20. The court accepted that his first federal complaint, filed near the end of the limitations period, tolled the statute while that action was pending under Michigan law, but held that tolling ceased when the district court dismissed that suit without prejudice and that his waiting more than a month before refiling rendered the present action untimely. It rejected his argument that he did not “fully realize” his injury until the arbitrator’s 2021 decision, noting that he “had already been ‘deprived’ of his job when he attended his arbitration hearing[,]” and that his allegations about the arbitration proceeding amounted “to ‘dissatisf[action] with the result,’ not the process,” so “knowledge of procedural defects is what counts” and the discovery rule did not change the accrual date. It also rejected his equitable-tolling argument, noting that tolling is “unavailable under the Michigan limitations provision at issue here.” Lastly, it held that even if his claim had been timely, he received “everything due process requires before termination” and also “enjoyed the minimal procedures needed for a post-termination hearing.” Affirmed.