Sentencing for failure to register as a sex offender; Procedural reasonableness of defendant’s term of supervised release; 18 USC § 3553(a) factors; Whether a district court may only consider a defendant’s mental illness for mitigation purposes; United States v Kluball (7th Cir); United States v Moses; 18 USC § 3661; Substantive reasonableness; Weight placed on the factor of defendant’s diagnosed mental illness history

The court held that the district court did not improperly focus on defendant-Roper’s mental health issues in imposing a 20-year term of supervised release, rejecting his argument that mental illness can only be used at sentencing “in the name of mitigation.” Roper is a convicted sex offender with three prior convictions for failing to register with state authorities. He pled guilty to a federal failure-to-register offense in this case. In addition to a 30-month prison sentence, the district court sentenced him to 20 years of supervised release, which was above the Guidelines but below the statutory maximum of lifetime supervision. Roper challenged the procedural and substantive reasonableness of his supervised release term, arguing that the district court erred by relying in part on his mental health issues. The court first noted that supervised release, rather than being a “punishment,” is instead “rehabilitative,” with consideration of “‘deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.’” Roper’s procedural reasonableness claim was based on the argument that “‘a defendant’s mental illness cannot justify extending a criminal sentence.’” He maintained that it can only be used to vary downward. The court rejected this argument, finding nothing in the statutory text supported it, and citing the Seventh Circuit’s holding in Kluball, that “‘the degree to which mental illness is deemed mitigating or aggravating, and the weight accorded that factor, lies within the sentencing judge’s broad discretion.’” Roper’s reliance on the analysis in Moses also failed. He could not “reconcile his mitigation-only approach with . . . § 3661, which dictates that ‘[n]o limitation shall be placed on the information concerning’ a defendant’s ‘background, character, and conduct’ that district courts ‘may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence.’” As to his substantive reasonableness challenge, Roper argued that the district court “placed too much weight” on the mental health factor. But the district court also considered other factors in making its decision. Its “concerns about Roper’s need for treatment, ‘poor . . . adjustment’ to rules in prison and while on supervision, deterrence, and public safety are ‘compelling’ justifications for a longer supervised-release term.” Affirmed.