Motion for relief from judgment; Good cause; MCR 6.508(D)(3)(a); Ineffective assistance of counsel; Actual prejudice; Sentencing; MCR 6.508(D)(3)(b)(iv); Validity of a second-degree murder sentence; People v Eads; People v Snow; Applicability of People v Beck; People v Motten

The court concluded that the trial court erred in denying defendant’s “motion for relief from judgment on the basis that he failed to establish good cause under MCR 6.508(D)(3)(a), and that he is entitled to resentencing for his second-degree murder conviction.” Thus, it reversed the trial court order denying his motion for relief from judgment, vacated his sentence for second-degree murder, and remanded for resentencing consistent with Eads. He was also convicted of assault with intent to rob while armed and felony-firearm. He “was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of 40 to 60 years for the second-degree murder conviction and 5 to 15 years for the assault with intent to rob while armed conviction, to be served consecutively to a two-year term” for felony-firearm. On appeal, defendant maintained “that he can establish good cause through ineffective assistance of counsel, and that the trial court made improper factual findings in the absence of an evidentiary hearing.” The court was not persuaded by his ineffective assistance of counsel arguments. In determining that he “failed to establish good cause, the trial court stated that ‘[a]ppellate [counsel] cannot be ineffective for failing to raise an issue that was unlikely to succeed on appeal or choosing to focus on arguments that had a greater likelihood of success.’” While he characterized “this statement as an improper factual finding, we note that the trial court’s observation is merely a statement of law.” Further, the court held that “the trial court did not err by determining that defendant could not prevail on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim.” But the court found that while he could not “demonstrate good cause on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel, good cause is established based on the recent changes in the law with respect to the sentencing of juvenile offenders.” Under the principles announced in Eads, the court agreed that his second-degree murder sentence was invalid and that he was entitled to resentencing. However, it rejected his claim “that on remand, the trial court should be instructed to follow the rule announced in” Beck, noting that it held in Motten “‘that Beck’s holding is not retroactive on collateral review.’”