Probable cause for a search warrant; MCL 780.651(1); People v Unger; Fourth Amendment reasonableness; People v Hughes; Particularity & nexus between place & evidence; People v Brcic; Deference to magistrate’s probable cause finding; People v Mullen; Use of officer experience in drug investigations; People v Darwich; Anonymous tip corroboration; Motion to suppress evidence; People v Mazzie; Franks hearing standard; People v Franklin

The court held that the search warrant for defendant’s residence was supported by probable cause and that the trial court properly denied his motion to quash the warrant, suppress the evidence, and obtain a Franks hearing. He was charged with multiple possession with intent to deliver narcotics offenses after officers executed a warrant at his home and seized various illegal drugs and related items. He unsuccessfully moved to suppress, arguing that the affidavit did not sufficiently connect his residence to drug trafficking and that the officer misrepresented his history. On appeal, the court explained that probable cause exists when “‘there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place’” and reiterated that “the affidavit underlying the warrant must be read ‘in a common-sense and realistic manner.’” It emphasized that officers had already executed warrants at homes associated with two brothers who were defendant’s alleged co-conspirators, where they recovered a digital scale with crack cocaine residue, fentanyl pills, a firearm, and additional crack cocaine residue, and seized cell phones showing “numerous drug text messages” between defendant and one of the brothers about “drug amounts, meeting locations and ‘catching plays,’ which is a common street term for making drug transactions.” The court further noted that “‘a magistrate’s finding of probable cause and his or her decision to issue a search warrant should be given great deference and only disturbed in limited circumstances.’” It concluded that the surveillance, controlled buys, shared vehicle use, and drug related communications gave a substantial basis to infer that evidence would be found in defendant’s home. As to the request for a Franks hearing, the court reiterated that the defendant must make a substantial preliminary showing that the affiant included a false statement knowingly or with reckless disregard for the truth. It held that defendant “failed to produce conclusive evidence” of falsity or recklessness, so the trial court did not err in denying an evidentiary hearing. Affirmed.