Auto negligence; Sudden-emergency doctrine; Presumption of negligence; MCL 257.402(a); MCL 257.627; Distinguishing Petrosky v Dziurman & White v Taylor Distrib Co, Inc; Questions of fact

In this negligence case arising from a motor vehicle accident, the court held that the trial court did not err by granting defendants’ (Singh and GIGG Express, Inc) “motion for summary disposition because it properly applied the sudden-emergency doctrine to the extent that reasonable minds could not differ that Singh was not negligent.” Singh, in his capacity as an employee of GIGG Express, “was driving a semitruck northbound in the middle lane of the I-75 expressway when he rear-ended a vehicle in which plaintiff was the passenger.” The court found the trial court did not err by granting defendants’ motion for summary disposition. It noted that in “this case, Singh could not have reasonably expected a nearly stopped vehicle in the middle lane of a dark expressway at night, particularly given that the vehicle did not activate its brake lights to indicate its slow rate of speed until Singh’s semitruck was already upon it, and there were no indications of a traffic stoppage or other impediments along the expressway.” On appeal, plaintiff relied largely on Petrosky and White, but both cases are distinguishable. In Petrosky, “the defendant in a lawsuit involving a rear-end collision claimed 18 months after the accident that he had experienced a sudden brake failure, but this contradicted his account at the time of the accident as well as other evidence in the case, creating a question of fact for the jury to resolve.” Similarly, in White, “the defendant rear-ended a vehicle after blacking out while driving, but there was evidence that he had been feeling ill for some time and chose to drive anyway, raising a question of fact for the jury about whether his emergency was truly unexpected.” By contrast, in this case, there were “no disputes of fact, defendant’s credibility is not in question, and his testimony is corroborated by video evidence. And on this record, a reasonable jury could only conclude that Singh ‘acted as a reasonably prudent person when facing the emergency.’” As such, it found that the ‘“clear, positive, and credible’ evidence in the record overcomes the presumption of negligence in MCL 257.402(a).” Thus, the court held that MCL 257.627 was inapplicable. Affirmed.