Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act (PWDCRA); Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (WPA); Wrongful discharge; Collateral estoppel; Collective bargaining agreement (CBA)

The court held that the trial court did not err in granting defendant summary disposition given that no genuine issue of material fact remained. Because a “federal court has already found that: (1) plaintiff does not have a disability recognized under the PWDCRA, (2) plaintiff is subject to the CBA, and (3) the CBA allows for a two-year leave of absence before termination ensues, collateral estoppel bars those issues.” Thus, plaintiff could not establish a prima facie claim of discrimination under the PWDCRA, WPA, or common law. The federal court found that plaintiff did not have a disability recognized under the PWDCRA, and he did not assert “that he has developed any new disability. Because plaintiff has already had the opportunity to argue whether he has a disability recognized under the PWDCRA, and because the federal court ultimately determined that he did not, the first two elements of collateral estoppel” were met as to this issue. In addition, “because the same exact parties were involved in the federal case, the third element of collateral estoppel—mutual estoppel—is necessarily met in this case.” Thus, plaintiff was “collaterally estopped from relitigating this issue, and his trial-court PWDCRA claims fail as a matter of law.” As he could not “establish a prima facie claim under the PWDCRA, the ‘additional fact’ of his termination is immaterial.” Accordingly, the trial court did not err in “granting summary disposition on plaintiff’s PWDCRA claims.” His WPA and wrongful-discharge claims were “predicated on the allegation that [he] was terminated in retaliation for reporting workplace safety concerns, filing an EEOC complaint, and testifying in a federal court proceeding.” Because plaintiff had “already had the opportunity to argue the terms of the CBA and whether it applies to his employment, and because the federal court outlined the relevant CBA terms and determined that the CBA applied to plaintiff, the first two elements of collateral estoppel” were also met as to this issue. And the court again held that “because the same exact parties were involved in the federal case, the third element of collateral estoppel— mutual estoppel—is necessarily met in this case.” Aa a result, plaintiff was “collaterally estopped from relitigating this issue.” Taking that fact into account, both his WPA and wrongful-discharge claims failed as a matter of law. Finally, because there was “no genuine issue of material fact, the trial court did not err by granting summary disposition on plaintiff’s wrongful discharge claim.” Affirmed.