Motions to quash bindover & to dismiss; Intent element of first-degree child abuse; MCL 750.136b(2); People v Maynor; An omission as the corpus delicti of first-degree child abuse; People v Morrow; Distinction between the first- & second-degree child abuse statutes

In an interlocutory appeal, the court held that first-degree child abuse may be committed by omission. It also concluded the evidence presented allowed the district court to appropriately draw inferences “to find probable cause to bind over defendant on the first-degree child abuse charge.” Thus, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying her motions to quash and dismiss. In Morrow, the court “rejected the argument raised in this appeal that by reading the first-degree statute to punish omissions, language in the second-degree child abuse statute would be rendered nugatory.” The court noted here that “the express inclusion of ‘omissions’ under the second-degree child abuse statute and failure to state the same in the first-degree child abuse statute does not necessitate the conclusion that the Legislature intended to exclude omissions from punishment under MCL 750.136b(2). Indeed, the first-degree child abuse statute also fails to use the term ‘act,’ when describing the manner in which an individual may commit first-degree child abuse, which indicates that first-degree child abuse could be committed by an act or omission.” The court found that the “key distinction between the two statutes is ‘whether the defendant intended the harm itself, not whether the defendant intended the act or omission that caused the serious harm.’” The evidence presented at the preliminary exam established “that defendant was the sole caretaker of AS. While in her care, AS was hospitalized because he had malnutrition and dehydration so severe that he had a dangerously high sodium level and encephalopathy. Because of the encephalopathy, AS was in ‘an altered level of consciousness’ and was difficult to keep awake. In addition, AS’s eczema was so uncontrolled and severe that certain areas of his skin were raw, open, and excoriated. Likewise, AS, who was 19 months old, weighed approximately 16 or 17 pounds, which was a troubling weight for a child of his age.” In light of his “malnourishment, altered mental state, and severely low weight, one could infer that defendant intended to cause serious physical harm or knew that serious physical harm would result from her failure to provide food and water to AS and from her failure to seek medical attention.” Affirmed.