Special assessment district (SAD) boundary confirmation timeliness; MCL 324.30707(5); In re Determination & Establishment of a Lake Level for the Waters of Stylus Lake (Unpub); Satutory construction; People v Yarema; Defined project, costs, proportionality & apportionment requirements; MCL 324.30711(1); In re Van Ettan Lake; Due process challenge to Part 307 procedures; In re Project Cost & Special Assessment Roll for Chappel Dam; Natural Resources & Environmental Protection Act (NREPA)

The court held that the trial court did not err by establishing and confirming the SAD boundaries for maintaining the level of Higgins Lake under Part 307 of NREPA. The case arose after petitioners-Roscommon and Crawford Counties sought to formally establish a SAD around Higgins Lake to support maintaining the court-determined lake level. The trial court held a hearing and entered an order the same day confirming the boundaries with amendments. It rejected objections that the petition was untimely and premature for lack of a defined project and cost, explaining the process was phased and that “there’s two parts: First, is establishing the boundaries of a [SAD] district which is why we’re here today. Once that’s done, if the county decides to go forward with the special assessment and assessing a tax . . . then an apportionment roll needs to be done; [f]urther hearings have to be held in that regard but that’s not why we’re here today.” On appeal, the court held the 60-day language in MCL 324.30707(5) was a directive to the trial court, not a jurisdictional bar, emphasizing “there is no express language within MCL 324.30707(5) precluding the [trial] court from confirming the [SAD] boundaries after those 60 days have passed.” It found the reasoning of an unpublished case (Stylus Lake) “persuasive and in line with the plain language of the statute and” adopted its reasoning. The court also held Part 307 does not require a defined project and costs before boundary confirmation, reasoning that “nothing requires the county board to identify a specific project and its costs before the creation or confirmation of boundaries,” and that proportionality and apportionment objections were “premature for purposes of this appeal.” The court finally held the due process argument was abandoned because respondents failed “to set forth the applicable legal principles,” and, even if considered, Part 307’s notice and hearing procedures provided a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Affirmed.