Prosecutorial error; Closing argument; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to request M Crim JI 7.23; Failure to interview & call additional witnesses; Trial strategy; Failure to present mitigating factors during sentencing; Prejudice

The court held that there was no prosecutorial error because the “prosecution made reasonable inferences” in closing argument. It also rejected defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims, concluding “the jury instructions given adequately presented the theory of self-defense, trial counsel’s decision to not call other witnesses was a matter of strategy, and mitigating factors were presented to the trial court” at sentencing. Thus, it affirmed her conviction of second-degree murder arising from the stabbing death of her former boyfriend (G). “In its closing argument, the prosecution alleged that [G] had been running away from defendant—that he was ‘running for his life.’ This was a reasonable inference given the facts of the case. [G] had three superficial wounds: two on his right hand and one on his neck. According to the medical examiner, the wounds to his hand may have been defensive. [G’s] unopened box cutter, glasses, and keys were also scattered in various places across the lawn, suggesting that he chose to flee rather than to fight. With that evidence, and defendant going inside the house and coming back outside with a kitchen knife, it was reasonable to assert that [G] was fleeing from defendant when [she] stabbed him (as opposed to [G] being the aggressor, as suggested by defendant).” The court added that, even “if the prosecution’s inference was unreasonable,” it did not see any reversible error given the trial court’s curative jury instructions. The court also rejected her claim that her trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request M Crim JI 7.23, concluding that while the exact language of the instruction was not given, “the trial court fairly and sufficiently instructed the jury that it should consider how the circumstances may have appeared to defendant, factoring in her knowledge of victim’s past acts.” It was also “reasonable for trial counsel to make the strategic decision not to call additional witnesses about whether [G] had pointed a gun at defendant when it was agreed that [G] behaved violently towards [her] in the past.” And defendant failed to “explain what other mitigating factors were present that trial counsel should have investigated” to present at sentencing.