Auto negligence; Governmental immunity; Motor-vehicle exception; Proper use of a turn signal; Gross negligence

The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for entry of an order granting summary disposition as to the claim against defendant-Dodd (a bus driver for defendant-city) individually because that claim was barred by governmental immunity where there was no evidence his conduct amounted to gross negligence. The case arose out of a collision between the bus driven by Dodd and a semi-truck. Turning first to the claim against the city, the issue on appeal, as framed by the parties, was “whether the trial court correctly determined that there was a genuine question of material fact regarding whether Dodd was negligent in his operation of the city bus for purposes of MCL 691.1405.” The question became “whether an improper use of a turn signal contrary to the driver’s actual direction of travel, if established as true, could constitute negligence. As an initial matter, even assuming that Dodd had the statutory right of way as the through driver pursuant to the traffic signal controlling the intersection, and acknowledging that he was ‘entitled to assume that subordinate drivers will yield him the right of way’ and was ‘not bound to anticipate unlawful or negligent acts on their part,’ the ‘favored driver’ nonetheless ‘is not permitted to lower his head, close his eyes, and charge blindly through intersections on the theory that such is his “right” simply because he is the favored driver.’” In addition, “because a motorist always has a duty to exercise reasonable care in the course of driving, . . . and because penal statutes in the motor vehicle code are not the sole or de facto source for defining the standard of care applicable to motorists,” the city and Dodd were “incorrect in their assertion that Dodd could not have been negligent merely because there is no statute specifically prohibiting the action of driving straight through an intersection with a turn signal engaged.” Thus, they did not “show that there is no evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, from which a trier of fact could reasonably conclude that Dodd was negligent, and” they did not establish that the trial court erred by denying summary disposition as to the claim against the city. As to the claim against Dodd individually, there was no record “evidence from which a trier of fact could reasonably conclude that Dodd recklessly or willfully disregarded precautions in a manner showing a substantial lack of care or concern for the safety of others.”