Use of broad terms in a FOIA request; Requirement that a request be sufficiently descriptive; Herald Co v Bay City; Whether disclosure was prohibited by MCL 15.243(1)(v) (records relating to a civil action in which the requesting party & the public body are parties); Taylor v Lansing Bd of Water & Light
Noting “there is no ban on the use of broad terms” in a FOIA request, the court held that plaintiffs’ “request was sufficient to allow a public body to know which records were being requested.” It further rejected defendants’ assertion that MCL 15.243(1)(v) prohibited disclosure here, concluding that plaintiff-ACLU was not a party in a separate case against defendant-city. Thus, it reversed the trial court’s order granting defendants summary disposition and remanded for entry of summary disposition for plaintiffs. Defendants’ denial of plaintiffs’ FOIA request was based “on the request being ‘overly broad, vague, and ambiguous’ because of the use of the words ‘any,’ ‘anytime,’ and ‘in any way.’ Defendants claimed that these words ‘individually or in compound form request information which asks for one, some, or all indiscriminately.’ They further asserted that because the FOIA requires a requestor to sufficiently describe the record which is sought, the requestor may not use broad terms. Defendants are incorrect.” The court noted that all “that is required is that the request must be ‘sufficiently descriptive to allow the public body to find public records containing the information sought.’” It found that the intent of the request appeared “amply clear. The request was for documents that relate, even minimally, to allegations or findings that police officers engaged in racial profiling, racial discrimination, harassment, or excessive force. How this request was deemed incomprehensible is mystifying.” It further noted that defendants did not adequately explain on appeal “how or why the request was indiscernible.” As to the applicability of MCL 15.243(1)(v), defendants’ contention “that the ACLU should be treated as a party in the Bryant federal litigation—because it is the plaintiffs’ agent in that case—is foreclosed by” the court’s decision in Taylor. Thus, the trial court erred in denying plaintiffs’ summary disposition motion and granting defendants’ summary disposition motion.
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