Standing; Unlawful seizure claim under state law & 42 USC § 1983; Jones v Powell; Effect of the loss of funds loaned for a bail bond; Challenge to the constitutionality of the police’s treatment of another individual; MCR 6.106; Distinguishing Barclae v Zarb

The court held that plaintiff “alleged sufficient facts to establish standing on” two counts of unlawful seizure. But the trial court properly found that he “lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of the police’s treatment of” his pregnant girlfriend (M), “despite his loss of the bail bond funds and the subsequent dismissal of the charges against” M. Plaintiff argued “that he maintained standing to challenge his unlawful seizure by the Heinz defendants, and he sufficiently pleaded claims on this basis.” The court found that “the trial court erred in determining that plaintiff failed to raise any constitutional claims arising from his alleged ‘seizure,’ and in concluding that [his] action pertained solely to the arrest and prosecution of [M]. Plaintiff expressly asserted two causes of action challenging the validity of the ‘traffic stop’ in both his original complaint and his proposed amended complaint, consistently contending that the Heinz defendants lacked reasonable suspicion to stop him, whether the alleged constitutional violation was attributable to the officers’ individual conduct or” defendant-City’s failure to properly train its officers. He “further submitted body-worn camera videorecordings from the Heinz defendants, and he delineated the sequence of events underlying the purported traffic stop. In conjunction with his state constitutional claims,” he also pursued claims under § 1983 in his proposed amended complaint, alleging that the “City and Heinz defendants violated his constitutional right to be free from unreasonable seizures. Plaintiff did so after defendants asserted that he was barred from seeking monetary damages pursuant to” Jones, “and that § 1983 provided the proper vehicle for obtaining such relief—an assertion that is correct.” The court found that “the trial court did not substantively consider the merits of plaintiff’s claims concerning the alleged traffic stop; instead, it summarily concluded that [his] action pertained only to defendants’ purported conduct toward [M], despite the record indicating otherwise. Further, [it] did not address whether defendants’ affirmative defenses, such as qualified immunity, barred plaintiff’s claims, and ultimately asserted that plaintiff lacked standing to pursue the action under state law and” § 1983. Thus, it “erroneously awarded summary disposition on this basis.” As to plaintiff’s reliance on the fact that he was the person who loaned M funds to post her bail bond, the court found that had he “challenged an issue directly related to the bail bond—such as its initial issuance, the amount required, or changes to the court rules or statutes governing the bond—he may have presented a more persuasive argument.” But his claims were “entirely contingent on the police’s alleged improper investigation of [M’s] charges, which resulted in plaintiff having to provide funds for the bond.” Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.