Free speech; 42 USC § 1983; Whether the permitted restricted area constituted a “public forum”; Whether the enforcement of the restricted area was “content neutral” & subject to intermediate scrutiny; Whether the enforcement of the restricted area was narrowly tailored; Whether there were alternative channels for free speech; Due process; Monell claim; Qualified immunity

The court held that the district court did not err by granting the defendants summary judgment on plaintiff-Blankenship’s free speech claim where the restrictions on “free speech” resulting from defendant-Metro Government’s (Metro) special use permit were not designed to hinder Blankenship’s free speech but were narrowly tailored to promote the government’s interest in crowd control. Metro issued Churchill Downs Race Track a special use permit in connection with the Kentucky Derby, committing to providing security for the area involved, and posting “no trespassing” signs. Blankenship, along with others, entered the posted area, with Blankenship preaching and the group passing out literature. They refused security personnel’s requests to leave. Eventually, a Kentucky State Trooper, defendant-Officer Young, arrested Blankenship, who then sued defendants under § 1983 for allegedly violating his right to free speech, free exercise, and due process. The district court granted defendants summary judgment with Officer Young receiving qualified immunity. Addressing the free speech issue, the court held that the restricted area constituted a “limited public forum” and not a “traditional public forum” as Blankenship argued. “Churchill Downs required that an individual have a ticket or other credentials to enter the immediate area surrounding the Kentucky Derby, not that an individual obtain permission before speaking.” The court agreed with the district court that the restrictions were content neutral and subject to intermediate scrutiny and the area was subject to time, place, or manner restrictions. It also held that the restrictions were “narrowly tailored” to serve “significant governmental interests” of crowd control, safety and convenience. Additionally, Blakenship could have exercised his free-speech rights outside the restricted area. His due process claim was premised on the restrictions “vagueness,” and his “bare assertions” that the restrictions were vague were insufficient to support the claim. The Monell claim failed where there was no underlying constitutional violation. This also held true regarding Officer Young’s qualified immunity. Affirmed.