Termination under § 19b(3)(c)(i); Child’s best interests; Relative placement; Guardianship; Delay of proceedings; MCR 3.977(I)(1); 70-day rule

The court held that (1) § (c)(i) existed, (2) the trial court did not err when it found that terminating respondent-father’s parental rights was in the child’s (BB) best interest, and (3) he did not provide the court “with a reason to believe that a timely decision would have resulted in a different outcome.” Clear and convincing evidence supported “the trial court’s determination that the conditions that led to adjudication continued to exist and there was no reasonable likelihood that the conditions would be rectified given BB’s age. BB came under the trial court’s jurisdiction following two police raids conducted on respondent’s residence within the span of a year, which the trial court found traumatized BB since BB was present for those raids. The trial court identified the primary barrier for reunification as respondent’s substance abuse disorder and his cycle of reincarceration. Although [he] engaged in substance abuse therapy in between and during incarcerations, he showed no substantial progress. Any progress he did achieve was immediately thwarted by his relapse into meth[] abuse. Admirably, [he] was able to complete a seven-month long in-patient rehabilitation program. However, this progress was achieved at the end of the proceedings and must be considered in light of respondent’s multiple prior relapses into drug use and subsequent incarceration.” The court noted that by “the time the termination proceedings had ended, the trial court calculated that BB had been in foster care for 595 days, 421 of which had elapsed since the issuance of the initial disposition hearing related to respondent. Even assuming that respondent was released from jail in [1/25], it would not have been reasonable for the trial court to conclude that [he] could rectify the conditions that led to adjudication given his history of conduct, the uncertainty surrounding how much more time he needed to fully address the barriers to reunification, and, most importantly, how much time BB had already waited for respondent to” show progress. While the trial court violated “the statutory 70-day rule and” MCR 3.977(I)(1), reversal was not warranted in this case. Affirmed.