Personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits; Motion for JNOV; Whether a vehicle caused the accident; Law-of-the-case doctrine; Kaur v Citizens Ins Co of the Midwest (Unpub) (Kaur II); “Domicile”; Judicial estoppel; Motion for a directed verdict; Attendant care; Exclusion of an insurer’s letter; Whether other evidence was improperly admitted; A police officer’s testimony; Relevance; MRE 403; Attorney misconduct; Attorney fees under MCL 500.3148(1); Appellate attorney fees

In this dispute between two insurers (defendant-Citizens and third-party defendant-Meemic) over responsibility for paying PIP benefits, the court affirmed the trial court in all respects, and remanded for consideration of appellate fees. The appeal arose from an accident that “occurred during a period when plaintiff and her husband,” nonparty-M, were residing in their son’s (nonparty-J) home in Canton. J was insured by Meemic. Citizens argued “that the trial court erred by denying its motion for JNOV or a new trial on the issue of whether a vehicle caused plaintiff’s accident.” Citizens was the insurer of the vehicle allegedly involved in the accident. Plaintiff argued “that the law-of-the-case doctrine precludes us from considering this issue because we previously decided, in Kaur II, that the jury would determine the cause of the accident.” The court held that “the law-of-the-case doctrine does not preclude Citizens from arguing on appeal that the evidence presented at trial was not sufficient to support the jury’s verdict.” The court noted that there “are two possible ways that a motor vehicle could have caused plaintiff’s accident: either the vehicle made physical contact with her, knocking her off her feet and onto the ground; or plaintiff reasonably feared that the approaching vehicle would strike her, causing her to take evasive action that led to her fall. Citizens denied that evidence supported either possibility.” As to the first possibility, “three physicians and an accident reconstruction specialist testified that plaintiff’s hip fracture was consistent with being hit by a vehicle, and unlikely to be caused by a simple fall.” Only one expert witness, who was not a medical doctor, “concluded that plaintiff’s injuries did not indicate that she was hit by a vehicle.” The court held that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict for plaintiff. As to the jury’s finding of domicile, among other things the court concluded that a “trier of fact could reasonably find from [the] testimony that plaintiff and [M] continued to maintain an Ontario domicile after they sold their home and began to move freely between their sons’ homes. Although they made arrangements to facilitate their stay in the United States, including the acquisition of permanent residency status and eligibility for Medicare, they never committed to establishing a new domicile in Michigan. Plaintiff stated that she intended to remain domiciled in Ontario. It was up to the jury to decide whether this testimony was credible or whether the facts concerning her living arrangements proved instead that she changed her domicile to Ontario.”