Termination under § 19b(3)(b)(i); Children’s best interests

Holding that § (b)(i) existed and that it was in the children’s best interests to terminate respondent-mother’s rights, the court affirmed. There was no dispute that her “acts caused physical abuse of one of the children, who was a sibling of the other child.” Indeed, she pled “guilty to child abuse on two different occasions.” Despite the physical abuse, she argued “that the trial court erred by failing to infer from her progress in her services that there was no reasonable likelihood either child would be harmed in her home in the future.” The argument was without merit. Respondent argued “that she was making progress and availing herself of all available services while incarcerated. But, this was the same pattern she displayed during the previous removal: respondent made rapid progress while being monitored, was reunited with her children, and then relapsed and abused one of the children. The trial court could reasonably extrapolate that pattern to the future,” and she had “not shown that there was a realistic probability that she would break the pattern this time.” Respondent argued “that it was speculative whether she would be unable to benefit from her services in light of the progress she made, but her history shows the converse—it would be speculative whether she could benefit from services and remain free from substances.” Further, the court found that “because her previous relapse occurred less than a year after the first reunification, the trial court found that, until respondent could prove lasting sobriety, it was reasonably likely that the children would be harmed in the foreseeable future if returned to her care. Under the circumstances and in light of [her] history, that finding was not clearly erroneous.”