Petition to take jurisdiction over the child; Adequate notice of a preliminary hearing; Notice by text message; MCR 3.965; Distinguishing In re Brown & In re Andeson; MCR 3.961(B)(6)
Because the petition to take jurisdiction over the child did not specifically notify respondent-mother “that the child was not going to be placed with her, and the proceedings did not comply with MCR 3.961(B)(6),” the court vacated the order authorizing the petition to take jurisdiction over the child, VLT, and removing the child from the mother’s care after the preliminary hearing, and remanded. The mother alleged “that she should have been served with a summons before the preliminary hearing, and that the failure to do so was a violation of her due-process rights.” The court disagreed because she “was provided notice of the hearing in a text message that she received, which satisfies the requirements of MCR 3.920(D)(2)(b) and MCR 3.965(B)(1).” The court noted that the cases respondent cited “do not stand for the proposition that her due-process rights were violated because she was not served with a summons before the preliminary hearing.” At the preliminary hearing here, “the referee heard testimony regarding the physical and sexual abuse allegedly perpetrated by father, and that [the] mother had not visited or provided financial support to VLT in over a year and that she had abandoned VLT. The referee ultimately concluded that authorization of the petition was warranted due to both father’s waiver of the probable cause determination and the testimony that supported a finding of probable cause. Under the court rules, the referee was permitted to conduct this probable cause inquiry without [the] mother present as long as the attempts to notify [her] of the hearing were ‘reasonable.’” However, the court vacated “because the proceedings did not comply with MCR 3.961(B)(6)[.]” It found that because “the petition stated twice that [the DHHS] did not object to placing the child with [the] mother, it is reasonable to conclude that [the] mother could have based her decision not to attend the preliminary hearing in part on these statements in the petition. At best, the petition was confusing regarding whether [the DHHS] sought removal of the child from” the mother. While she “received notice of the hearing, she was not notified that the requested relief changed. Because [she] was not adequately notified regarding the specific relief requested in the petition, she did not receive all the process she was due before the preliminary hearing according to MCR 3.961(B)(6).”
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