Ineffective assistance of counsel; Prejudice; Strickland v Washington; People v Walker (On Remand); Distinguishing People v White

The court affirmed “the trial court’s decision to vacate defendant’s” AWIGBH conviction “and reinstate the original charge of felonious assault, habitual fourth, allowing [him] to reconsider pleading guilty as initially charged.” It concluded that the trial court’s ineffective assistance finding was “buttressed by the fact that defendant testified that he was not aware of the 25 year mandatory minimum sentence enhancement until the preliminary examination for the increased charge.” The court found that by “integrating the assistant prosecutor’s assertions regarding repeated notifications to trial counsel concerning the intent to pursue enhanced charges, the trial court established a sufficient basis to conclude that trial counsel was aware of the prosecution’s intentions yet failed to effectively communicate this critical information to the defendant.” The court noted that the “trial court deemed the testimonies of both trial counsel and defendant credible, ultimately determining that defendant was not apprised of the prosecution’s stance. Given that [its] findings are substantiated by the record, they do not rise to the level of clear error.” The prosecution contended that defendant had “not met the prejudice prong of the Strickland test.” It asserted that he failed to show “a plausible likelihood of accepting the plea offer or that the trial court would have approved such a plea due to defendant’s consistent assertion of innocence throughout the proceedings. According to the prosecution, for defendant to now claim a willingness to accept a plea would amount to an admission of perjury. However, the prosecution’s argument” failed to consider that the court “has held that a defendant who maintains innocence at trial is not foreclosed from claiming ineffective assistance of counsel based on trial counsel’s failure to inform defendant of a plea offer.” The court noted that “the trial court implicitly determined that the prejudice prong of Strickland was satisfied by its citations to supporting evidence within the record.” The prosecution asserted “that defendant’s statements reflect an unwillingness to plead unless offered additional concessions. However, defendant’s testimony can also be reasonably construed as indicating a willingness to accept a plea if he had been informed of the prosecutor’s intention to escalate the charges. An agreement to refrain from pursuing a higher charge contingent on a guilty plea could be perceived as a significant benefit.” The court found this case was “analogous to Walker and distinguishable from White in that the defendant was not made aware of the plea offer.” Affirmed in part, dismissed in part, and remanded.