Reasonable reunification efforts; MCL 712A.19a; In re Hicks/Brown; Desertion; § 19b(3)(a)(ii); In re Knipp

The court held that the trial court erred by terminating respondent-father’s parental rights at an initial dispositional hearing because reasonable reunification efforts were required and the statutory desertion period had not elapsed. Respondent was not present at the child’s birth, was initially difficult to locate, appeared from jail, and was treated as a putative father pending DNA testing. The trial court conditionally took jurisdiction and ordered that reasonable efforts be made once paternity was established, including a psychological evaluation, substance use assessment, and parenting time within DHHS discretion. Before the scheduled next hearing, a referee conducted a dispositional hearing after receiving DNA results, deemed respondent the legal father, found desertion, concluded “reasonable efforts were not necessary,” and terminated parental rights. The trial court affirmed. On appeal, the court reiterated that absent aggravating circumstances, the DHHS “‘has an affirmative duty to make reasonable efforts to reunify a family before seeking termination of parental rights,’” and it “‘is not relieved of its duties to engage an absent parent merely because that parent is incarcerated.’” The referee’s aggravating-circumstances rationale relied on abandonment under MCL 722.638(1)(a)(i), but the court explained that where termination is premised on desertion under § (a)(ii), the record must establish at least 91 days of desertion by a known parent. Under the analysis in Knipp, “conduct after being ordered to determine paternity, but before a judicial determination of paternity was made,” may be considered, yet the timing still matters. Here, respondent was ordered to complete DNA testing on 1/23/25, and parental rights were terminated on 4/16/25, meaning only 83 days elapsed. Thus, the court held that “sufficient time had not passed to establish desertion or abandonment.” Because the statutory ground failed, and the determination that reasonable efforts were not required was likewise erroneous given the trial court’s earlier order directing services once paternity was established, the court vacated and remanded.